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THE SECOND-ORDER STRUCTURE OF
IMMIGRATION LAW
Adam B. Cox* and Eric A. Posner**
Immigration law concerns both first-order issues about the number and
types of immigrants who should be admitted into a country and second-order
design issues concerning the legal rules and institutions that are used to
implement those first-order policy goals. The literature has focused on the first
set of issues and largely neglected the second. In fact, many current controversies
concern the design issues. This Article addresses the second-order dimension and
argues that a central design choice all states face is whether to evaluate potential
immigrants on the basis of pre-entry characteristics (the ex ante approach) or
post-entry conduct (the ex post approach). The ex post system provides more
information and thus results in more accurate screening than does the ex ante
system, but it also may deter risk-averse applicants from making country-specific
investments that benefit the host country. Focusing on this important tradeoff for
states, as well as other costs and benefits of the two screening regimes, this
Article evaluates America’s reliance on an “illegal immigration system,” the
growth in ex post screening during the twentieth century, and America’s unique
focus on family-related immigration.
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law has long been underappreciated in the legal academy but,
as so often happens, the pressure of current events is causing scholars to rethink
old ideas. Two such events are of special importance. First, the U.S.
government’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks raised questions about the extent to
which the norms of equal protection apply to noncitizens on American soil. In
the immediate aftermath of the attacks, federal officials conducted sweeps in
which they rounded up over a thousand noncitizens on alleged visa violations.
Nearly all of these noncitizens were from predominantly Muslim countries.
Many were detained for months without charges, and some were eventually
released without ever being charged.1 The Department of Justice subsequently
pursued several other immigration initiatives that targeted noncitizens from
predominantly Muslim countries.2
Second, the influx of undocumented aliens in the 1980s and 1990s, most of
them Hispanic, has brought to the headlines the traditional litany of complaints
about immigration: that noncitizens take the jobs of citizens, that they
overwhelm social services, and that they cannot be assimilated if they arrive in
excessive numbers.3 In the early 1980s, undocumented immigrants made up a
1. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22-35 (2003).
2. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV.
373, 413-14 (2004). These initiatives included a special registration program that required
noncitizens from such countries to report to the INS to be fingerprinted, photographed, and
interviewed; the Absconder Initiative, which targeted noncitizens from “al Qaeda nations”
for removal; and Operation Liberty Shield, which subjected asylum applicants from many
predominantly Muslim countries to mandatory detention. Id.
3. See, e.g., PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA’S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER (1995); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES
TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004); Tom Brune, Laying Down the Law, NEWSDAY,
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small fraction of the entering flow of immigrants, with approximately 130,000
crossing the border each year.4 By the late 1990s, however, nearly one million
undocumented immigrants were entering the United States each year—roughly
the same number as were immigrating through legal channels.5 Today,
Congress is debating whether to overhaul the immigration system. The reform
proposals include criminalizing unauthorized presence in the United States and
creating a large-scale guest worker system.6
The current debates differ from many of the major historical debates about
immigration policy inasmuch as they focus on what we will call second-order
issues of institutional design rather than first-order issues of immigration
policy. First-order issues address the ultimate ends of immigration policy:
simplifying greatly, these ends entail admitting the state’s desired quantity and
types of immigrants. Quantity refers to the number of noncitizens granted
lawful permanent residency every year. In the United States, the quantity of
legal entries per year has varied between 400,000 and 1.8 million over the last
three decades.7 Type refers to the characteristics of the people who are granted
lawful permanent residency—their status as family members of U.S. citizens,
their work skills, their ability to assimilate, and related characteristics. Secondorder design issues concern the legal institutions that are used to implement the
first-order policy goals. Focusing on second-order design raises the question of
how to screen applicants for admission so that the desired types are admitted
and others are excluded.
The academic literature on immigration law and policy has largely
neglected these second-order questions of institutional design. Its focus has
been almost exclusively on two other questions: on the first-order question of
how many, and whom, to admit;8 and on the question of what role courts play
July 18, 2006, at A19; Julia Preston, Texas Hospitals’ Separate Paths Reflect the Debate on
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006, at A1; Nicholas Riccardi, Immigration Hard-Liners
on a High, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2006, at A1; Allan Richter, Drawing Workers, and Some
Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, § 14LI, at 1.
4. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS
AND CHARACTERISTICS 5 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.
5. Compare Office of Policy & Planning, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: 1990 to
2000 (2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_
Report_1211.pdf, with Kelly Jefferys & Nancy Rytina, Office of Immigration Statistics,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Legal Permanent Residents: 2005 (2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/USLegalPermEst_5.pdf.
6. See John D. McKinnon, Bush Continues to Push His Plan on Immigration, WALL
ST. J., July 8, 2006, at A4; Julia Preston, House and Senate Hold Immigration Hearings,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A12.
7. See Jefferys & Rytina, supra note 5, at 1 fig.1.
8. See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION (2d ed.
1999); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL.
251 (1987); Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson,
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in policing immigration policy.9 But the second-order question is at least as
important as the first-order question. Indeed, if a state makes poor second-order
design choices, the importance of the first-order question fades: one cannot
have an immigration policy if one cannot enforce it. And the role of courts
cannot be understood apart from broader issues of institutional design.10
One of our contributions is to identify the importance of second-order
questions and provide a framework for addressing them. A central design
choice for any state, we argue, is the choice between ex ante and ex post
screening. Under an ex ante approach, a state decides whether to accept a
particular immigrant on the basis of pre-entry information, such as the
immigrant’s race or her educational achievement in her home country. In
contrast, an ex post approach selects immigrants on the basis of post-entry
information, such as her avoidance of criminal activity or unemployment in the
host country. The ex ante approach generally, though not unavoidably, leads to
a system of exclusion at the border; the ex post approach necessarily leads to a
system of deportation. Much of the history of immigration policy can be
characterized by one of these two main approaches, but little effort has been
made to explain why a state would select one approach or the other.
We explore the advantages and disadvantages for a self-interested state of
the ex ante and ex post approaches, as well as combinations of these
approaches, and generate predictions about the circumstances under which one
approach will dominate. We argue that immigration screening presents an
information problem, and that the comparative effectiveness of ex ante and ex

Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003).
9. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold:
Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1998); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100
YALE L.J. 545, 580-83 (1990). In addition to these two literatures, there is a large social
science literature that focuses on migration’s causes and consequences—economic, social,
cultural, and otherwise. See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN’S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1999); DETERMINANTS OF EMIGRATION FROM MEXICO,
CENTRAL AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN (Sergio Díaz-Briquets & Sidney Weintraub eds.,
1991).
10. Although there is a small literature on second-order questions of institutional
design, it lacks a theoretical framework. It focuses piecemeal on such questions as whether
illegal immigration is best deterred by greater border or interior enforcement, by sanctioning
employers who hire undocumented aliens or imposing sanctions on noncitizens themselves,
or by giving authority to the federal government or to the states. See, e.g., Douglas S.
Massey, Beyond the Border Buildup: Towards a New Approach to Mexico-U.S. Migration,
IMMIGR. POL’Y IN FOCUS (Immigration Policy Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2005; Peter H.
Schuck, Some Federal-State Developments in Immigration Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 387 (2002). These are all important issues, but they are only individual aspects of the
overall institutional design of the immigration system and cannot be resolved without
reference to a theory of that design.
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post screening turns in part on the solution to that problem.11 The main
screening advantage of the ex post system is that it uses more information (both
about the immigrants and about the country’s current needs) than the ex ante
system does, which minimizes errors. The main advantage of the ex ante
system is that it reduces the risk faced by potential immigrants that they will be
deported, so that risk-averse noncitizens are more likely to enter and invest in
the country than they are under the ex post system. There are also other
important tradeoffs. The ex post system requires a probationary period that can
be costly—if, for example, dangerous noncitizens commit crimes before being
evaluated and deported, or if immigrants develop local ties that are disrupted
by deportation. By contrast, the ex ante system can avoid these costs by
excluding people at the border. Moreover, the two systems depend on different
enforcement schemes, though it is unclear which is more costly: the ex ante
system depends on the ability to control the border; the ex post system depends
on the ability to detect noncitizens in the host country’s territory.12
Our framework clarifies numerous positive and normative questions about
immigration law. We argue that port-of-entry exclusion systems (which are
predominantly ex ante) result in poorer screening than post-entry deportation
systems (which are predominantly ex post), but also encourage risk-averse
immigrants to make country-specific investments of value to the host country,
and may be cheaper to enforce. The choice between the two systems turns in
part on tradeoffs among these variables. We also argue that although the U.S.
de jure system is highly (although not entirely) ex ante, the U.S. de facto
system is predominantly ex post—this is the “illegal immigration system” that
results from deliberate underenforcement of immigration law plus periodic
amnesties. We explain why, for immigrants covered by the illegal system, the
government might prefer such ex post screening to an ex ante regime. And we
argue that the government might choose the illegal system over a legal version,
which would be a large-scale guest worker program, because the illegal system
skirts constitutional restrictions that would reduce the advantages of a legal
11. As far as we have found, no one has recognized that immigration policy faces this
asymmetric information problem. The most prominent economic work on immigration, such
as that of George Borjas, addresses the first-order issues of type and quantity, with some
attention to the problem of illegal immigration but mainly as an enforcement problem. See
BORJAS, supra note 9.
12. Our argument is based on models of contracting and asymmetric information in the
economics literature. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY
(2005). Our argument that the academic literature should focus on second-order questions
has analogies in many other policy areas—for example, the transition from the debate about
whether markets are good or bad to the debate about how industries organize themselves.
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1-3 (1988). The tradeoffs we
discuss have also been identified in other contexts in the law and economics literature
pertaining to risk regulation. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
277-85 (1987) (discussing ex ante and ex post approaches to regulation); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683
(1994) (discussing the tradeoff between error costs and investment incentives).
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program. We also use our theory to explore why the role of ex post screening in
the American system has steadily increased over the last century, and discuss
the potential second-order policy justifications for America’s uniquely familybased immigration system.
Our plan is as follows. Part I contains a brief description of the three
conceptual elements of immigration law and policy: the first-order policy
goals; the second-order rules of institutional design; and constitutional
restrictions. Part II sets out our theory of second-order institutional design: we
show how information problems motivate the choice between ex ante and ex
post screening and lay out several positive implications of our theoretical
model. Part III uses the theory as a lens to analyze American law. It argues that
many features of immigration law are consistent with the factors identified in
our theory of second-order institutional design, and speculates that divergences
between theory and practice may in part be attributable to constitutional
restrictions.
I. OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW
In this Part, we briefly survey immigration law in the United States to
highlight the ways in which it reflects second-order design choices and
constitutional constraints, not merely first-order policy goals.
A. First-Order Policy Preferences
A central goal of immigration policy for all states is, at a very high level of
abstraction, to expand the polity by admitting desirable people.13 Nonetheless,
states have different attitudes about which potential immigrants are desirable
under various circumstances. These differences lead states’ first-order policy
preferences to diverge along three main dimensions: with respect to the
quantity of immigrants, the type of immigrants, and the terms of admission.14
Quantity. States can choose a range of numerical restrictions. At one
extreme, a state permits no immigration; at the other extreme, a state permits

13. We do not mean to suggest that immigration policy is driven solely by the goal of
selecting the most preferred group of immigrants. In addition to using immigration policy as
a selection mechanism, the United States has often used immigration law for many other
purposes, including the promotion of other domestic or foreign policy objectives. For
example, Congress has at times admitted, excluded, or deported immigrants specifically to
send a signal to other states or to domestic political audiences. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R.
STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1789 TO THE
WAR ON TERRORISM (2004). While these other aims also shape immigration policy in
important ways, for the purposes of this Article, we are interested exclusively in the way in
which states use immigration policy to shape the size and composition of the polity.
Accordingly, we will focus on the selection-related aspects of immigration policy.
14. See BORJAS, supra note 9, at 176 (discussing quantity and type).
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unlimited immigration.15 Nearly all states choose intermediate points, but there
is still a great deal of variation. Prior to the twentieth century, the United States
had no formal numerical limits; beginning in 1921, the United States imposed
an immigration ceiling of 350,000 on the Eastern Hemisphere.16 Over time,
that ceiling ranged from 150,000 (in 1927) to 700,000 (in 1990) and since 1965
has covered the entire globe.17 Because of exceptions to the ceilings, actual
immigration has been somewhat higher; for example, in 2004 legal
immigration exceeded 946,000.18 By comparison, legal immigration in the
same year was 202,300 in Germany, 175,200 in France, 88,300 in Japan,
235,800 in Canada, and 266,500 in the United Kingdom.19

15. Actually, these extremes can be exceeded. On one side, states can expel people
from the existing polity. See, e.g., MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 71-75 (2004) (discussing the mass repatriation of
Mexican Americans during the 1930s). On the other side, states can bribe (or coerce) people
to immigrate (indeed, can conquer and assimilate populations). See, e.g., GAVAN DAWS,
SHOAL OF TIME: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (1968) (discussing the United
States’s colonization and assimilation of the Hawaiian kingdom). There is also the question
whether a state should restrict exit—that is, emigration. Many states have historically
restricted exit as well as entry. Nonetheless, for two reasons we focus exclusively on entry
restrictions: first, we are interested in the way that immigration policy is used to select new
members, not the way in which it might be used to compel continued membership; and
second, modern liberal democracies uniformly permit unrestricted exit and the United States
has never restricted exit in any significant way.
16. Quota Law of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (introducing overall quota of
350,000 and limiting the admissions level of aliens of any nationality to three percent of the
foreign-born persons of that nationality living in the United States in 1910). See generally
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Legislation from 1901-1940, at 3, available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Legislation%20from%201901-1940.pdf.
17. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a)-(b), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (reducing ceiling
to 165,000 or two percent of each nationality’s population in the United States; in effect until
June 30, 1927, when the level would be reduced to 150,000); Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 1, 21(a), 21(e), 79 Stat. 911, 911, 920-21 (limiting for
the first time the number of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere and raising the
combined ceiling to 290,000—170,000 from the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 from the
Western Hemisphere); Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 1, 92 Stat. 907 (leaving
ceiling at 290,000 while eliminating the Hemisphere quota split); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-212, § 203(a), 94 Stat. 102, 106-07 (lowering ceiling to 270,000); Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 311(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3434 (raising
ceiling to 540,000); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 101(a), 112(a), 104
Stat. 4978, 4981-82, 4987 (raising ceiling to 700,000 for 1992-1994, setting the ceiling at
675,000 thereafter). Because refugees and close relatives are not counted toward the ceiling,
actual immigration has been higher, as noted in the text.
18. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
OUTLOOK 30 tbl.I.1 (2006).
19. Id. These figures show that substantially greater numbers of immigrants came to
the United States than these other large democracies. If the immigration flows are measured
as a fraction of existing population, however, the picture is more mixed. In 2004, legal
immigration to the United States constituted approximately 0.32% of the existing
population. This is a larger fraction than in France (0.28%), Germany (0.25%), or Japan
(0.07%), but a smaller fraction than in the United Kingdom (0.44%) or Canada (0.74%).
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Quantity restrictions can take various forms. As noted above, the U.S.
federal government placed few formal restrictions on immigration prior to the
1870s.20 During this period, the government often took steps to increase the
size of the immigrant flow.21 Even after the federal government began to place
statutory limits on the types of immigrants who could enter, it did not place
numerical restrictions on the overall size of the immigrant flow. The first
statutory limits on the annual flow of immigrants were not adopted until shortly
after World War I.22 These initially temporary limits were codified in the
national origins quota system a few years later, but even these quota laws
applied only to the Eastern Hemisphere.23 Only in the last forty years has the
United States established relatively rigid global numerical restrictions on the
annual number of immigrants the country will admit.24
Type. States also regulate the type of person who may immigrate. Some
states use a point system that favors applicants with desired characteristics.25
These typically include the ability to speak the native language, work skills,
educational achievement, and propensity to obey the law. For example, Canada
awards points to applicants who are highly educated; who speak English and
French proficiently; who have work experience; who are between twenty-one
and forty-nine years old; who have arranged for employment in Canada; and
(under the category of “adaptability”) who have an educated spouse or partner,
have had prior work experience in Canada, or have a family relation in
Canada.26 The United States places more weight on family relationship, though
it too favors immigrants who have desired work skills.27 Before it imposed
numerical restrictions, the United States did not have such elaborate and
specific criteria for type, but it would be a mistake to think that the type of

20. For a discussion of state laws that had the effect of regulating some immigration
during this period, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (17761875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
21. See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006).
22. See Quota Law of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5.
23. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 1, 79 Stat.
911 (setting numerical ceilings on both Western and Eastern Hemispheres for the first time);
Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 1, 92 Stat. 907 (combining for the first time the
separate hemispheric quotas into a single global quota); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-649, § 101, 104 Stat. 4978, 4981 (setting current ceiling).
25. New Zealand, for example, requires that immigrants applying as skilled workers
pass a test that matches their skills with the country’s current needs. See Immigration New
Zealand, The Skilled Migrant Category Points Indicator, http://www.immigration.govt.nz/
pointsindicator.
26. See Citizenship & Immigration Canada, Six Selection Factors and Pass Mark,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/qual-5.html.
27. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2007)
(describing annual immigration limits); CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 1.03(2)(e) (2006) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE].
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immigrant is a new concern. The Alien and Sedition Acts passed by the first
Congress permitted the deportation of disloyal or subversive aliens,28 and
many states in the post-founding era had laws that permitted the expulsion
(from state territory) of public charges and criminals.29 Starting in 1875,
Congress passed laws designed to exclude noncitizens on the basis of race
(initially Chinese, then covering noncitizens from most of East and South Asia)
and later on the basis of national origin (disfavoring, for example, southern
Europeans).30 Today, the United States treats a criminal record as an important
indication that a person is of an undesired type.31
Terms of admission. States also differ in the status that they confer on those
permitted to immigrate. At one extreme, a state may confer full citizenship on
an immigrant; at the other extreme, a state may permanently deny an immigrant
the legal incidents of citizenship. For example, while the United States places
substantial constraints on the numbers and types of immigrants it admits, today
it places relatively few conditions on their terms of admission. Most
noncitizens admitted to lawful permanent residence in the United States have a
relatively easy path to citizenship.32 They must live in the country for five
years before becoming eligible to naturalize, but this is nearly the only
meaningful condition they must satisfy.33 Many other states have been less
welcoming. In Germany, for example, a guest worker system under which
resident workers (and their children) were ineligible for citizenship was the
norm for much of the twentieth century.34 Moreover, the naturalization
requirements have not always been so easy to satisfy in the United States. Until
1952, the United States restricted naturalization on the basis of race, which had
the effect of permanently depriving some immigrants of access to full
membership in the political community.35

28. Act of June 25, 1798 (Alien Enemies Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800).
29. See Neuman, supra note 20, at 1841-59.
30. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988); NGAI, supra note 15; LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995).
31. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (listing criminal grounds of
inadmissibility).
32. All states deny citizenship to some noncitizens who enter the country. That is
because states admit noncitizens on a variety of temporary bases. As we explain below,
however, our focus is principally on the process of permanent immigration. See infra text
accompanying notes 36-37.
33. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 23 (1990) (noting that the United States does most of its selecting at
the entry stage and not at the naturalization stage).
34. See Nicole Jacoby, Note, America’s De Facto Guest Workers: Lessons from
Germany’s Gastarbeiter for U.S. Immigration Reform, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1569 (2004);
see also Veysel Oezcan, Migration Policy Inst., Germany: Immigration in Transition (July
2004), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=235.
35. The first naturalization law restricted naturalization to “free white person[s].” Act
of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. While the Fourteenth Amendment extended citizenship
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We should be clear that we describe here only the immigrant admission
system in the United States, not the system used to admit nonimmigrants.
Nonimmigrants are those noncitizens admitted for a temporary period, such as
tourists or employees who receive temporary authorization to work in the
country.36 Immigrants, by contrast, are admitted to permanent residence in the
country—residence that is not contingent on retaining employment, learning
English, and so forth—and are on a path to eventual citizenship. (For that
reason admitted immigrants are typically referred to as “lawful permanent
residents”). We focus on the structure of the immigrant system, because our
interest here is in the system that the state uses to select those in the immigrant
pool whom it considers desirable to add to the country’s population and
eventually to the citizenry.37 As we explain below, however, a state might
choose to use a temporary immigration system—such as a guest worker
program—as a screening mechanism for potential permanent immigrants.38
This highlights one last important point about first-order preferences—a
point that foreshadows the following discussion on second-order design.
Though restrictions concerning immigrant numbers, types, and terms of
admission often reflect a state’s first-order preferences, they need not always
do so. Because such restrictions are closely interrelated, a restriction along one
dimension can be used as an instrument to advance a different first-order
preference. Restrictions on terms of admission are, as we note above, one
example of this. Numerical restrictions offer another example: they can reflect
a first-order preference, but can also be used as a second-order mechanism to
control the types of immigrants (and vice versa). The national origins quota
system that Congress enacted in 1924 was designed to do just this: the quota
after the civil war to all persons born in the United States, race-based naturalization policies
continued. All “races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere” were not added until the
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 303, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140, and Congress did not extend
the right to naturalize to all Asians until 1952, see Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477,
§ 311, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1422) (“The right of a person to
become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of
race or sex or because such person is married.”). However, the effect of racially restrictive
naturalization laws was lessened by the fact that, for much of this period, the United States
prohibited immigration by those who were ineligible to naturalize. See Immigration Act of
1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 162. For that reason, many potential immigrants of
Asian ancestry who would have been ineligible to naturalize were also prohibited from
immigrating to the United States.
36. See INA § 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (setting forth the grounds for the admission of
nonimmigrants to the United States).
37. A lawful permanent resident becomes a citizen by undergoing naturalization
procedures. Because these procedures are not significant and at the same time many lawful
permanent residents (LPRs) do not bother with them, we do not focus here on naturalization
rules. However, we do not think that citizenship policy is unimportant. For a discussion of
the connections between immigration policy and citizenship policy, see HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN
THE UNITED STATES (2006).
38. See infra Part III.B.2.
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law’s formula was intended to constrict the flow of immigrants from southern
and eastern Europe, whom Congress saw as racially inferior to their western
and northern European counterparts.39
B. Second-Order Institutional Design
Second-order institutional design focuses on the sorting of applicants for
immigration. How do states screen out undesired types so that only desired
types will be admitted?
Substance. The American approach is formally embodied in three
prominent features of U.S. immigration law: the requirements for admissibility,
inadmissibility, and deportability.40 An applicant is admissible if he satisfies
the legal grounds of admission, of which the two most important are having
family members living in the United States and qualifying for work that cannot
be performed by an American worker.41 But such an applicant can be excluded
if he falls under any of the criminal, health, or national security grounds of
inadmissibility specified in section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).42 For example, under the INA, an otherwise admissible noncitizen is
inadmissible if he has a prior conviction for a “crime involving moral
turpitude,”43 if he has provided “material support” to a designated terrorist
organization,44 or if he is HIV positive.45
The INA also provides for post-admission screening, authorizing the
government to deport certain noncitizens after they have been admitted to the
country, largely on the basis of their post-entry activities but also if their
39. See ZOLBERG, supra note 21, at 258-64. Because the focus was on European
immigration, the quota law did not apply to states in the Western Hemisphere. See
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 4, 43 Stat. 153, 155.
40. We focus on the immigration regulatory mechanisms that directly regulate
potential immigrants, placing conditions upon their entrance and continuing residence in the
receiving state. These are the policies at the core of what people usually consider to
constitute immigration law. There are, of course, non-screening strategies a state might
pursue to select its preferred mix of immigrants. For example, a state could attempt to alter
directly the basic conditions that give rise to migration. If migration is driven in part by the
domestic demand for labor, the state could try to reduce that demand by taxing or
sanctioning employers who hired immigrants, by providing labor protections for some
immigrants to make them more expensive employees, or so on. Similarly, if migration is
driven in part by economic conditions in the migrants’ home countries, the receiving state
could give foreign aid to the home state in order to improve economic conditions and reduce
these “push” factors. These approaches and many others—including state intervention in
overseas conflicts—can be used to change the magnitude of migration, its character, or both.
41. See INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (“Preference allocation for family-sponsored
immigrants”); INA § 203(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (“Preference allocation for employmentbased immigrants”).
42. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
43. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
44. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
45. INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(i).
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original application was fraudulent.46 The deportability provisions are similar
to the inadmissibility grounds in section 212. For example, a number of the
crime- and national security-related grounds of inadmissibility are also grounds
of deportability.47 However, the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability
are not coextensive, as we will discuss in Part III.48
Parallel to this legal track, following which immigrants present themselves
for admission and are evaluated under the admissions rules, there is an illegal
track. Many immigrants sneak across the border with no documents, overstay
tourist or temporary work visas, or use fraudulent documents to enter.49 These
unauthorized immigrants are often much easier to deport, both on substantive
grounds and (as we will discuss shortly) as a matter of procedure, than are legal
immigrants.50 Though the presence of unauthorized immigrants is generally
treated as an enforcement failure, we will argue that the illegal track reflects
policy choices and has advantages for the government.
Procedures. The substantive criteria are applied in diverse procedural
settings. For the most part, American immigration law reserves the most
summary procedures for non-resident aliens who arrive at a point of entry
(either along the border or at an airport) and seek admission to the country
without documents or with fraudulent documents. These noncitizens are subject
to a summary screening process known as expedited removal.51 Under
expedited removal, a single immigration official decides, on the basis of the
noncitizen’s documents and an interview, whether she is entitled to enter the
country. If the official concludes that she is, then she is admitted; if the official
concludes that she is not, then she is detained and removed from the country.52
Noncitizens screened through the expedited removal process generally do not
have access to a lawyer or other procedural protections,53 and the government

46. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
47. See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (making deportable
any noncitizen “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years
. . . after the date of admission”); INA § 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (making
deportable for terrorist activity “[a]ny alien who is described in subparagraph (B) or (F) of
section 212(a)(3) [the inadmissibility section of the INA]”).
48. See infra Part III.A.2.
49. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 1096-1182 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing unauthorized migrants in the
United States).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
51. See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
52. See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
53. See INA § 235(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C). There are some limited
exceptions: the noncitizen is provided more procedural protections if she is found to have a
credible fear of persecution if she returns to her home country, see INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii),
(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B), or if she claims under oath to be a lawful
permanent resident, see INA § 235(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C).
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takes the position that they may not seek judicial review of the immigration
official’s decision.54
By contrast, lawful permanent residents whom the government attempts to
deport are entitled to a formal removal proceeding. This proceeding begins
with a hearing before an administrative immigration judge.55 Informal rules of
evidence apply, and the noncitizen has the right to be represented by a lawyer
(though not at the government’s expense) and the right to testify and cross
examine witnesses.56 At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties can appeal
the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals.57 And
in many cases, the noncitizen can also petition the federal courts of appeal to
review final orders issued by the Board.58
While the above rules might suggest that the level of procedural formality
turns on whether a noncitizen has entered the country, it is important to
recognize that the INA sometimes authorizes the use of summary procedures
for noncitizens who have already entered. Expedited removal, for example, can
be used against recent undocumented immigrants apprehended within 100
miles of the border.59 Conversely, immigration law sometimes provides more
extensive procedures for noncitizens seeking entry—doing so, for example, in
instances where the noncitizen seeking entry has previously been admitted to
lawful permanent resident status in the United States.60 Thus, the level of
procedure provided to immigrants by modern American immigration law often
54. See Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated as moot, 324 F.3d 1109
(9th Cir. 2003).
55. See INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (“Removal proceedings”).
56. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1240.10(a)(4) (2007).
57. See id. § 1240.15.
58. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (“Judicial review of orders of removal”).
59. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Department
of Homeland Security Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border (Jan. 30,
2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0845.shtm; see also
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-01 (Aug. 11, 2004)
(authorizing the use of expedited removal against noncitizens found within 100 miles of the
Mexican or Canadian border who cannot demonstrate to an immigration enforcement
official that they have been in the United States for more than fourteen days). Moreover,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has authority under the INA to expand the use
of expedited removal to cover the entire interior of the country and all non-admitted aliens
who cannot demonstrate that they have been continuously present in the United States for at
least two years. See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). In addition,
expedited removal is not the only summary enforcement mechanism that applies to
noncitizens who have already entered the country. Noncitizens who re-enter the country
illegally after previously being deported are subject to a summary procedure known as
"reinstatement of removal” regardless of how long they have been present in the United
States. See INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). And noncitizens who are not lawful
permanent residents are subject to summary procedures when they are deported for certain
criminal convictions. See INA § 238(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a) (describing administrative
removal for criminal aliens).
60. See INA § 235(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) (excepting those who claim to
be lawful permanent residents from the expedited removal process).
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turns more on whether the noncitizen has previously been lawfully admitted by
the immigration authorities, rather than on whether the noncitizen has
physically entered the country.61
C. Constitutional Restrictions
The state’s second-order strategies are often shaped by constitutional law.
For that reason, we briefly mention here constitutional restrictions on
immigration law in the United States. Although the Supreme Court has not
spoken clearly on this issue, conventional wisdom holds that constitutional
restrictions on immigration law are less strict than they are with respect to other
areas of the law. Simplifying greatly, we can summarize as follows the basic
contours of when courts hold that the Constitution applies in immigration
contexts with minimal, moderate, and ordinary force:
Minimal force. The government is least constrained by the Constitution
when it takes an immigration-related action against a noncitizen who arrives at
the border for the first time. Courts have at times suggested that the
government may exclude such a noncitizen for any reason—even on the basis
of race or some other ground that would ordinarily be constitutionally
suspect.62 Similarly, courts have sometimes intimated that the government is
free to enforce its exclusion policy with whatever summary procedures it
deems appropriate, on the ground that the Due Process Clause does not
constrain the government in such situations.63
61. The regulatory focus on admission rather than entry is in large part the product of
Congress’s comprehensive revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1996. Prior to
1996, the INA differentiated principally between the concepts of exclusion and deportation.
“Entry” marked the dividing line between exclusion and deportation, and “entry” typically
meant physical entry into the United States. Thus, noncitizens who had entered—even
surreptitiously—were subject to grounds of deportability rather than excludability; they were
also entitled to the greater procedural protections of a deportation proceeding rather than an
exclusion proceeding. See generally Matter of Lin, 18 I. & N. Dec. 219 (B.I.A. 1982). In
1996, Congress rewrote the INA, largely eliminating the exclusion-deportation line and
replacing it with a focus on the concept of “admission.” See Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
“Admission” rather than “entry” now marks the dividing line between the application of
grounds of inadmissibility or deportability. And because admission is specifically defined as
“the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer,” this change puts immigrants who sneak across the border on the same
footing as those who present themselves at the border. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13). Both are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility, and both are more likely to
be screened using summary procedures.
62. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.
1984) (en banc).
63. See, e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. 206. Compare Borrero v. Aljets, 325 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir.
2003), with Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). This account
almost surely overstates the extent to which the government operates without constitutional
constraints when noncitizens present themselves for initial admission to the United States.
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Moderate force. The government is more constrained by the Constitution
when it takes an immigration-related action against a noncitizen who has
achieved a greater constitutional status than a first-time arriving alien. Courts
suggest that noncitizens may receive additional constitutional protections when
they have entered the territory of the United States, when they have established
significant ties to the United States, or when they have achieved a legal
immigration status under statutory and regulatory immigration law.64 So, for
example, courts have held that the government is more constrained by the
Constitution when it seeks to deport a lawful permanent resident (LPR) than
when it seeks to exclude a first-time arriving alien.65 This does not mean,
however, that the Constitution applies with ordinary force in these contexts.
The picture is mixed. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from
subjecting an LPR to the expedited removal procedures that it uses to screen
first-time arriving aliens at airports.66 But courts are divided over the extent to
which substantive constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause
and the Free Speech Clause apply to limit the power of the government to
deport LPRs.67
Ordinary force. The government is most constrained by the Constitution
when it regulates lawful resident aliens outside the immigration context, in
purely domestic arenas. In the foundational equal protection case Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,68 the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause protected
resident Chinese aliens from a racially discriminatory laundry ordinance in the
same way that the clause would have protected citizens.69 Courts have applied

Arriving aliens appear to have at least some minimal process rights—such as the right to file
a habeas petition if in custody—and they may have other rights as well. See Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581. Moreover, the government may be
constrained in some situations by the rights of citizens when it acts to exclude noncitizens
from the country. See Cox, supra note 2. Still, it is accurate to say that both substantive and
procedural constitutional constraints are at their weakest when the government enforces
immigration policy against arriving aliens.
64. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S.
86 (1903); see also Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407
(2002). While it is unclear under contemporary constitutional law what logical role each of
these factors plays in determining a noncitizen’s constitutional status, much turns on the
answer. For example, if legal status were a necessary condition, noncitizens who have
entered the United States without being admitted by the immigration authorities might lack
any constitutional rights with respect to immigration actions taken against them and might,
consequently, be treated by the federal government in the same fashion as arriving aliens.
65. Compare Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), with Borrero, 325 F.3d 1003.
See generally David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for
Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47.
66. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21; cf. Yamataya, 189 U.S. 86.
67. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471
(1999); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
68. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
69. See id. at 374.
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this holding to encompass a wide variety of domestic regulations and a broad
spectrum of constitutional rights. The First Amendment has been held to
prohibit the punishment of noncitizens for engaging in protected speech,70 the
Fifth Amendment to guarantee criminal process protections to noncitizens
charged with crimes,71 and so on.
As we will explain in Part III, these differential constraints are also crucial
to understanding the structure of immigration regulatory policy in the United
States.
II. THE THEORY OF SECOND-ORDER IMMIGRATION DESIGN
A central second-order design question is how to sort applicants for
immigration, so that only the desired types are admitted, where the desired type
is just the type of person who satisfies the criteria derived from a state’s firstorder immigration goals.72 This design question is central because a person’s
type is information that is hidden from the state, and indeed often from the
applicant herself.73 For example, states want people who are assimilable.74
Some applicants do not know whether they can assimilate easily; they just do
not know whether they will fit in. Others, such as those plotting terrorist or
criminal activity, do have this information. Neither kind of applicant will reveal
her type to immigration authorities—the first because she cannot, the second
because she cannot gain from doing so. The second-order design trick is to
determine the immigrant’s type, even when she is unwilling or unable to reveal
it.
A. Information and Screening Devices
Ex ante. How does the state distinguish desired and undesired types? A
simple but incomplete answer is that the government could demand that the
applicant supply credentials that prove that she has the desired characteristics.

70. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (citing Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941)).
71. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
72. To be clear, we do not take a position as to what it is that makes a person fall into a
particular “type”—that is, whether type is the product of innate characteristics or instead the
product of social, economic, or other circumstances.
73. As will become clear, we analyze the government’s second-order immigration
design problem as a problem of hidden or private information, which is extensively
discussed in the economics literature. See, e.g., BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 12, at
47-99.
74. We use the term “assimilable” throughout in the broadest, most catholic sense—to
refer to an immigrant’s ability to adjust to living in a new society. Often, of course, the
United States has also desired immigrants who are assimilable in a different, more
controversial sense: immigrants who will abandon the cultural practices of their countries of
origin and “Americanize.”
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The applicant could provide, for example, a diploma that shows that she has
acquired desired high-technology skills abroad, or evidence of work experience
that shows the same. If assimilability is a concern, the applicant could show
that she has learned the native language or that she has family members in the
country. In these ways the applicant would prove that she meets the state’s
criteria for the high-quality noncitizen.
To see the problem with this answer, one must distinguish between the
type of the noncitizen and the evidence or proxy that might be correlated with
type. Recall that type is private information; it will be revealed to the
government only years later (perhaps never) when the noncitizen is productive,
assimilated, and so on. Further imagine that type is a continuous variable, and
any noncitizen can be placed somewhere along a line segment from zero
(lowest type) to one (highest type). The government’s first-order goals
determine the place on this line segment that divides the type of noncitizen who
should be admitted and the type of noncitizen who should not be admitted. For
convenience, we will say that the dividing line is at 0.5. Thus, noncitizens who
are of type 0.4 should not be admitted, while noncitizens of type 0.51 should be
admitted. Because the noncitizen’s type is private information, immigration
authorities who examine her diploma and other pieces of evidence will be able
only to infer the noncitizen’s type within a confidence interval.
The breadth of the confidence interval depends on the degree to which the
visible proxies are correlated with type. If some measure of education—years,
grades, and so forth—were perfectly correlated with type, then the design
problem would be easily solved. Immigration authorities would admit or reject
on the basis of this measure of education. But immigration goals are more
complex, and paper credentials are not necessarily accurate proxies for a
noncitizen’s type. Consider, for example, the factor of assimilability. Ability to
speak English and the existence of family and friends in the United States may
all be rough proxies for assimilability, but the best evidence may simply be the
person’s ability to live in the United States for an extended period of time. It
may turn out that many non-English speakers with no family and friends in the
United States can assimilate easily; and, further, that many people without
much education or job training can be productive members of society. If so,
even the simple proxies we have discussed—such as a diploma showing
advanced studies or English-speaking ability—would exclude many highquality noncitizens, yielding numerous false negatives.
The system we have described can be called a (pure) ex ante system. An ex
ante system determines whether noncitizens will be allowed to enter and stay in
the United States entirely on the basis of pre-entry credentials, credentials that
are determined in advance and identified at the border. These credentials are a
proxy for the person’s type. Noncitizens who have these credentials are
admitted; noncitizens who do not are excluded. The credentials typically
include educational achievement, the possession of skills that are in local
demand, wealth, health, and similar qualities. The American system, as we will
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discuss, is partially, but not fully, ex ante. It also has an important ex post
component.
Ex post. To understand the ex post system of immigration, we begin with
the pure version, which is rarely seen in the modern world, but which has some
important precursors. The pure ex post system determines the noncitizen’s type
after she has entered and resided in the country for a period of time—what we
will call the probationary period. Criteria for “admission”—that is, allowing the
noncitizen to stay and eventually naturalize—are applied to the noncitizen’s
conduct after entry, rather than to her achievements or features prior to entry.
Suppose, for example, that the state admits anyone who applies for entry
or, by lottery, more people than the state believes it will eventually want to
stay. Noncitizens then remain for a probationary period of, say, five years. At
the end of the period, the person is evaluated. If the noncitizen has steady,
productive work, has learned English, has not committed any crimes, and
otherwise has behaved herself, she is given the option to remain and naturalize;
otherwise, she is deported.
The main advantage of this system over the ex ante system is that the state
can use information that emerges from the noncitizen’s residence in the United
States (and, of course, pre-entry information as well). This information will
often improve the correlation between the proxy and the type. A person with
high-tech skills who is not able to find a job is most likely a low type; a person
with no skills who is able to find a good job is likely a high type. Such people
would be false positives and false negatives in the ex ante system, respectively,
but they will be identified correctly and treated properly by the ex post system.
Although the ex post system depends on a correlation between post-entry
behavior and type (a person who commits a crime might actually be a high
type), this correlation will often be stronger than the correlation between preentry behavior and type, especially in the case of unskilled workers, whose ex
ante credentials are likely to be very similar to each other. Indeed, because the
ex post system can use information about pre-entry characteristics as well, it
cannot be less accurate than the pure ex ante system.
A closely related point is that the state will often have better information
about its own needs at some time after, rather than before, a particular
immigrant or group of immigrants has entered. So far we have assumed that the
government knows at time 0 what its immigration needs will be at time 1.
But a persistent problem for governments is that migrants needed for the
economic boom at time 0 become unwanted competitors for jobs during the
bust at time 1, or potential terrorists or subversives during a national security
crisis at time 1. Ideally, a government would like to be able to screen
immigrants on the basis of such information at time 1 as well as at time 0.
To see why this matters, imagine that the institutional design decision is
made at year 0, and labor, security, or political conditions are revealed at
year 1. Suppose further that the optimal type at year 0 is a function of
conditions at year 1. In other words, the state does not know whether the floor
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for the optimal type will be 0.3 or 0.7 at year 1, and can only predict that each
is equally likely. Under a system of only screening noncitizens when they first
apply for admission, the state must predict conditions at year 1 and admit
people on the basis of this prediction about the future optimal type. The state
might, for example, set the floor at 0.5, which means that the stock of
noncitizens at year 1 will be too large or too small. Under a delayed screening
system, the state can wait until year 1 and then remove or retain noncitizens on
the basis of an accurate assessment of the optimal type.75 If the floor at year 1
is 0.3, then the state will deport everyone below 0.3; if the floor is 0.7, then the
state will deport everyone below 0.7.
In sum, whether a “type” of immigrant is desirable depends both on the
characteristics of a particular person and the needs of the government.
Information about both will typically be more plentiful after entry than before.
The advantage of the ex post system is that it permits the government to use
this additional information prior to determining whether an immigrant will
remain in the country and eventually become a citizen.76
B. Risk and Country-Specific Investment
While ex post screening provides more accurate information—both about
an immigrant and about the state’s needs—such screening does come at a cost.
As we noted above, ex post screening entails delayed screening. Delayed
screening creates a period of uncertainty for the immigrant. During the
probationary period, the noncitizen knows that there is some chance that she
will be deported on the basis of new information. This is a disadvantage of the
ex post system: risk-averse noncitizens who do not know whether they will be

75. Note that this later screening could be based on either ex ante or ex post
information about the noncitizen, but most likely would include both.
76. To be clear, we should highlight the distinction between two important choices that
a state must make when structuring its immigrant screening system. First is the choice
between screening on the basis of pre-entry information or on the basis of information that
develops post-entry. Second is the choice between screening at the point of entry or at some
later time. Obviously, these two choices are connected. As noted above, a state cannot
engage in ex post screening when an immigrant first applies for admission. But if a state
chooses to screen immigrants at some time after entry, it can do so on the basis of either ex
ante or ex post criteria. The following table provides the three combinations.
Time of admission
Ex ante information

Port of entry screening

Ex post information

[None]

Later time
Post-entry screening based
on pre-entry information
Post-entry screening based
on post-entry information

Because our interest is principally in the information problem presented by immigration, we
use the terms ex ante screening and ex post screening to capture the distinction in the
information dimension, not the temporal dimension.
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retained may be reluctant to come to the country and make country-specific
investments.77
Country-specific investments can be defined, by analogy to relationshipspecific investments,78 as investments whose return can be obtained only
through continued residence in the country. For example, a noncitizen who
learns American workplace norms makes an investment—the cost incurred in
learning those norms—whose return she can obtain only though continued
work in the United States. By contrast, a resident noncitizen who obtains
transportable technical skills does not make a country-specific investment.
Such investments could be labor-related, but they need not be: they could also
be social, familial, and so on. The personal relationships that a noncitizen
develops after entering the country, for example, are lost or seriously impaired
if that noncitizen is deported.79
All else equal, it is generally better if the immigrant makes a countryspecific investment than if she does not. If she does, she will generate more
value; this value can be divided between her and the state. For example, if she
learns workplace norms, she will obtain a better job, earn more money, and pay
more taxes, all to the benefit both of the immigrant and the state. Thus, the state
would like to encourage immigrants to make a country-specific investment; the
problem is that the immigrant may fear that if she does, she will lose it, with
the result that she will be worse off.
To understand the problem, consider the baseline case of the risk-neutral
immigrant and a state with a perfect enforcement system. Both sides know that
the state might decide, after entry, that the immigrant does not belong to the
high type for reasons unrelated to the immigrant’s post-entry conduct. Many
states face volatile economic and security environments, which may suddenly
and unexpectedly reduce the value of the continued presence of some or all
noncitizens. An economic downturn may cause natives to pressure the
government to remove foreigners who are perceived as competitors for scarce
jobs; a security threat, such as a war, may lead to worry about the intentions of
enemy aliens. What this means is that the optimal type can be a function of
events that occur after entry. The optimal country-specific investment will thus
be somewhat less than what it would be if the chance of the shock were zero.
The risk-neutral immigrant will make this investment or something close to it,
assuming that she obtains the return in the form of a salary or other benefit that
is not excessively taxed.

77. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 12 (describing the risk/information tradeoff in the
context of risk regulation).
78. See generally BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 12, at 489-91.
79. The legal structure of American immigration law accentuates the extent to which
investments in personal relationships are country-specific. Noncitizens who are deported are
inadmissible for at least ten years after being deported. See INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).

February 2007] SECOND-ORDER STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION LAW

829

In the real world, by contrast, immigrants are risk-averse, and immigration
authorities make errors. In such a world, immigrants may fear that if they make
costly country-specific investments, they will be deported in error. If they are
risk-averse, they will be discouraged from optimal investment. For example, an
immigrant may fear that she will be falsely convicted of a crime and deported,
thus losing her country-specific investment.
A solution to this problem is for the government to commit not to rely on
post-entry information when determining whether to deport the immigrant.
This means that the noncitizen takes no risk of erroneous deportation once she
is admitted on the basis of pre-entry information. With this security, she may
make the optimal country-specific investment.
To sum up the argument so far, a central advantage of the ex post system is
that it permits the government to use more information in determining whether
a noncitizen is a desirable type; a central disadvantage is that it will excessively
discourage risk-averse noncitizens from making country-specific investments
and, thus, because the benefit of immigration must be lower, from immigrating
in the first place.
A note on moral hazard. Our approach is very simple, and it could be
complicated in many ways, but these complications do not change the basic
story. One of our assumptions is that types the government deems desirable
will make the optimal country-specific investment once admitted; but this
assumption is not necessarily true. Consider instead the possibility that
immigrants could obtain a positive return by refraining from making countryspecific investments and “shirking” in additional ways—for example, by
engaging in criminal behavior—even though they know they will be deported
at the end of the probationary period. This could be true for desirable types as
well as undesirable types. If this is the case, an ex ante system will be
inadequate. All types will enter and then shirk after entry.
Desirable types, however, are often more deterrable than undesirable types.
Suppose the government desires successful workers. Because its desired type
of immigrant obtains a greater return from legal work, those immigrants’
relative gains from, say, crime are lower. Thus, an ex post sanction on
noncitizens who commit crimes or otherwise fail to make a country-specific
investment will impose lower costs on the desirable type (who will invest
instead of shirking) than on undesirable types (who will either incur the
sanction or invest, but at higher cost to themselves). An appropriately
calibrated ex post sanction will discourage entry from undesirable types but not
from desirable types.80 It is perfectly possible that the sanction would have to
be greater than mere deportation; a criminal punishment might be necessary.
The gains from such an approach would then have to be balanced against the

80. The discussion in the text is based on an economic model that combines
asymmetric information about type and ex post moral hazard. See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT,
supra note 12, at 228-32.
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costs—namely, that desirable types who are risk-averse might refrain from
entering and investing lest they erroneously be classified as criminals,
sanctioned, and deported.81 If moral hazard by immigrants is a serious concern,
the case for the ex post system improves, but it nevertheless remains possible
that the ex ante system is superior because of the importance of risk-aversion
and country-specific investment.
Moral hazard by the government is also a possibility. If immigrants
undertake country-specific investments with the hope that doing so will
improve their chances of making it through ex post screening, the government
might benefit by ever-delaying that screening. Through delay, the government
can obtain more benefits from the immigrants without bearing the costs of
providing them with more secure status. If this sort of shirking by the
government is a serious concern, the case for the ex ante system improves,
assuming that the ex ante system can be constitutionalized or otherwise used as
a constraint on the government.
C. Other Factors
There are other advantages and disadvantages of the different screening
approaches. Two should be mentioned because of their prominence in
immigration debates.
Enforcement costs. The ex ante system is more desirable if the government
can effectively patrol the border. If the government cannot, then it can remove
noncitizens only by patrolling the interior and deporting those who are
discovered. In the United States, this typically happens when a noncitizen
commits a crime and is captured by local police.82 As long as removal occurs
after entry, then the government might as well use ex post as well as ex ante
information.
Controlling the border can be expensive, but whether it is expensive or not
depends on numerous factors—including the length of the border, the
ruggedness of the terrain, and the difference between quality of life on either
side of the border. The last factor is worth emphasizing. The Mexican and
Canadian borders are both very long, but Canadians are less interested in
migrating to the United States than Mexicans are, because Canada is much
wealthier than Mexico. Topography also matters: island nations like Britain
and Japan can rely more heavily on the ex ante system than can the United
States, because it is more costly for noncitizens to cross large bodies of water
than to step across an invisible line.

81. Specifically, risk-averse people who have already entered will invest more in
order to avoid the punishment, but in order to avoid this cost, fewer risk-averse people will
immigrate in the first place.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 133-34.
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While difficulty in enforcing the border makes ex post screening relatively
more attractive, it also reduces the absolute effectiveness of screening
altogether. After all, immigrants who are deported after ex post screening may
simply sneak back across the border. For that reason, states without perfect
border enforcement often attempt to deter deported immigrants from reentering
by imposing criminal sanctions.83 Relatedly, governments can and do
supplement ex post sanctioning with border exclusion: people who have been
deported generally are denied readmission.84
Residency-related costs. The ex post system also has its own distinctive
disadvantage, which is that the noncitizen’s residence in the state during the
probationary period can bring with it costs that the ex ante system avoids.
There are several potential costs. First, the noncitizen may commit crimes, and
no realistic ex post sanctions, including criminal penalties, could reduce the
rate of criminal activity to zero.85 Applicants excluded at the border cannot
commit crimes within the territory. So a nation with inadequate local policing
or serious crime problems might prefer the ex ante system in order to keep
potential criminals off its territory. Second, under the ex post system
noncitizens may develop local ties during the probationary period. These ties
can make deportation seem unfair, or harmful to citizens who are friends or
relatives. The ex ante system avoids this cost as well.
D. A Comparison
Our theory suggests that a central advantage of ex post screening compared
to ex ante screening is that it increases accuracy for the government by making
available more information, and that a central disadvantage is that it reduces
immigrants’ incentive to make country-specific investments, and so possibly
their incentive to apply for admission in the first place. More specifically, the
ex post system becomes more desirable when:
(1) The correlation between pre-entry characteristics and type
becomes weaker relative to the correlation between post-entry
behavior and type (and type is private information or unknown to the
immigrant himself). An ex post system is not necessary when type is
racial, for example, because race can usually be determined on the
83. American immigration policy has long included criminal sanctions for immigrants
who re-enter illegally after being deported. See INA § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326. These sanctions
are greater than the criminal sanction for a first-time illegal entrant. See INA § 275, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325.
84. U.S. immigration law does just this: noncitizens who are deported are inadmissible
if they apply for readmission “within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or
removal (or within 20 years of such date in the case of a second or subsequent removal or at
any time in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) . . . .” INA §
212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
85. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 12, at 279-81 (stating that an ex ante regulation is better
when injurers cannot pay for harm done because of inadequate assets or detection problems).
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basis of physical features, which can be inspected by the entry officer.
The ex post system becomes more advantageous as assimilation
becomes more important, because an immigrant’s ability to adjust to
living in a new society is much more difficult than race to determine
on the basis of ex ante criteria.
(2) Economic and security conditions become more unpredictable.
The government benefits from retaining the right to deport people
(who might otherwise be satisfactory) on the basis of information
about the government’s needs that arises after entry. And given that
the deportation judgment occurs after entry, post-entry activities can
be used as an additional source of information about the quality of the
noncitizen.
(3) Country-specific investment becomes less important. If countryspecific investment adds a great deal to the value of the noncitizen for
the host state, then the state, to encourage such investment, must
promise the noncitizen not to deport him except under special
circumstances. This reduces the value of deportation proceedings,
which makes the ex ante determination relatively more valuable.
(Relatedly, the ex post system is more attractive when immigrants are
less risk-averse.) However, when country-specific investment is
unimportant and post-entry moral hazard is a serious concern, then the
case for the ex post system improves.
(4) The cost of detecting and deporting people on American territory
declines relative to the cost of excluding people at the border. As
border control becomes more costly, post-entry deportation becomes a
more cost effective means of control, in which case post-entry
conduct can be used to evaluate the noncitizen. If exclusion at the
border is cheap, then this additional information might be forgone for
the cost savings.
(5) Residency-related costs decline. When resident aliens are unlikely
to commit crimes or cause other harms during the probationary
period, the probationary period does not seriously create risks for
citizens. This could be the case, for example, if areas in which
noncitizens reside are effectively patrolled by local police, or if
immigrants are more law-abiding than citizens. Similarly, when
resident aliens are unlikely to form bonds with local citizens, the
welfare loss and political costs of deportation after the probationary
period will be relatively low. This might be more likely to be the case
when noncitizens come from countries for which there are no existing
immigrant communities into which they would otherwise be
integrated.
As noted above, optimal immigration design will usually involve both ex
ante and ex post controls. A state applies general criteria ex ante and excludes
those who do not satisfy them; then the state evaluates the noncitizen with
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additional criteria ex post, criteria that are based on her performance after
arrival. Indeed, the state might find it useful to have two or more “tracks” that
different aliens are placed on. This possibility is suggested by the economics of
contracts literature, which argues that employers that hire workers under
conditions of asymmetric information should offer a menu of contracts.86
Consider, for example, an immigration system that offers three kinds of
visas. First, people who can prove that they have skills that U.S. employers
greatly demand are given the right to enter, plus the right not to be removed
unless they commit a serious crime or become a public charge. Second, people
who cannot prove that they have desired skills are given the right to enter
(perhaps on a lottery basis), plus they can be removed for any reason or no
reason. Third, people who cannot prove that they have desired skills are given
the right to enter (perhaps on a lottery basis), plus they must make a payment or
post a bond, which they forfeit if they are removed; they can be removed only
if they commit serious crimes or become public charges.
Credentialed high types can enter with the first visa; uncredentialed but
hard-working high types can enter with the second and third visas, in the latter
case by borrowing against human capital. Low types cannot enter with the first
visa because they do not have credentials and with the third visa because they
cannot borrow against their human capital. They will also not want to enter
under the second system as they will quickly shirk, be caught, and be removed,
so that they gain less than the cost of entry. This is how the system would work
in theory; in practice, of course, some uncredentialed high types would be
screened out because they cannot borrow against their human capital, and some
low types would obtain entry with the second visa and escape detection and
removal. But this “menu” system—with an “easy-in-easy-out” track and a
“difficult-in-difficult-out” track, and perhaps variations of each—should be
superior to a system that treats everyone the same.
Whether or not a menu is used, the menu metaphor usefully highlights the
way that a well-functioning immigration system should lead potential
immigrants to self-select. With enough information about American
immigration rules, potential migrants who satisfy the criteria will enter while
those who do not will not enter, sparing the government costly enforcement
resources. This is true regardless of whether there are multiple immigration
tracks or just one.
E. Positive Implications
Several predictions emerge from our analysis. It is not our purpose here to
test our predictions, which would be a large undertaking; instead, we provide
each prediction and an illustration of the type of evidence that would confirm
or undermine it. One should keep in mind that an adequate empirical test would
86. See BOLTON & DEWATRIPONT, supra note 12, at 93.
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need to control for all variables, so we do not mean to suggest that these
predictions can be easily mapped to American or foreign history and practice.87
All of our predictions assume that the government seeks to maximize the
welfare of its own citizens, and not potential immigrants or other foreigners.88
If this assumption is wrong because of political dynamics, constitutional
restrictions, or some other reason, then the predictions will be false. We will
return to these possibilities in Part III.
(1) As the value of a noncitizen for a country increases with the
noncitizen’s country-specific investment, the noncitizen will be granted greater
protections against removal.
Consider, for example, that Japan and the United States compete for highly
skilled migrants.89 To function effectively in these countries, the migrant must
learn the language. A migrant who learns English obtains a transportable skill
that can be used in other countries—not just Canada, Britain, and Australia, but
also many European countries where English is the de facto language of
business. A migrant who learns Japanese obtains a much less transportable
skill. Thus, learning Japanese is a particularly country-specific investment;
learning English is not nearly as much of one. Thus, we predict that Japan and
most other countries would provide greater ex post protections to migrants
lured over to provide needed skills than would the United States or another
English-speaking country.
(2) As the value of a noncitizen for a country is increasingly (negatively)
correlated with exogenous factors such as security threats and economic
downturns, the noncitizen will be granted fewer protections against removal.
Wealthy, populous countries are buffered against security and economic
shocks to a much greater extent than poor and thinly populated countries are.
Given an identical shock, a large country would gain less from removing
noncitizens (as labor competitors, or threats) than a small country would. Thus,
we predict that larger and wealthier countries provide greater ex post
protections to migrants than smaller and poorer countries do, holding constant
the proportion of migrants in the population. For example, a large country with
few migrants like Japan would provide greater ex post protections than small
countries with many migrants like the Persian Gulf States.90
87. For example, our predictions assume that states act as rationally self-interested
actors. Political dynamics and other features may undermine this assumption.
88. We also ignore here the possibility that ex post screening increases the likelihood
that the welfare of particular citizens is tied to the welfare of particular immigrants—where,
say, a citizen develops social or familial ties with an immigrant. This possibility could also
raise the relative cost of the ex post system, even for a government focused solely on the
welfare of its own citizens.
89. See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive
Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006).
90. The Persian Gulf states have historically relied heavily on guest workers from
Egypt and South Asia, but have maintained tight control on these temporary immigrants,
conferring few benefits and resorting to strict cutbacks on work permits and mass
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(3) As ex ante screening technology improves relative to ex post evaluation
technology, the immigration system is more likely to be ex ante than ex post, or
to include more ex ante elements and fewer ex post elements.
Consider two countries, one of which wants to import only high-skilled
labor and the other of which has a general labor shortage, including unskilled
workers. It seems plausible that a country can more easily evaluate highly
skilled labor on the basis of pre-entry criteria than low-skilled labor—where it
is hard to distinguish people on the basis of their credentials.91 If so, we would
predict that nations that permit a small amount of highly skilled immigration
relative to their labor force will rely more heavily on ex ante criteria, and that
nations that permit a large amount of relatively unskilled immigration relative
to their labor force will rely more heavily on ex post criteria. Japan is in the
former category; the United States is in the latter category. A similar point can
be made about the relative cost of guarding borders and patrolling the interior.
III. THE SECOND-ORDER STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW
So far we have established three points: (1) that issues of second-order
design, often overlooked, are critical to making sense of the structure of
immigration law; (2) that one central design decision for any state is what mix
of ex ante and ex post screening mechanisms it will use to shape its immigrant
population; and (3) that, roughly, ex post systems provide more accurate and
flexible screening than ex ante systems while discouraging country-specific
investment by risk-averse noncitizens. In this Part, we use these ideas to
evaluate prominent features of American immigration law and proposals for
reform.
A. Ex Ante vs. Ex Post
1. The shift from exclusion to deportation
The government can pursue its first-order policy goals by excluding
undesirable immigrants when they attempt to enter the country, or instead by
deporting those immigrants at some point after their entry. An important
question about the structure of American immigration law is why the United
States chooses to use the mix of exclusion and deportation that it does. Part II
suggests a partial answer to this question: the choice between exclusion and

deportations where perceived necessary. See ANDRZEJ KAPISZEWSKI, NATIONALS AND
EXPATRIATES: POPULATION AND LABOUR DILEMMAS OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
STATES 5 (2001) (“[Expatriates] are temporary residents only and denied the possibility of
obtaining citizenship; they are always dependent on a national who is responsible for all
their legal and financial dealings; they have to leave the country once unemployed; and they
are barred from any type of political involvement.”).
91. See infra text accompanying note 136.
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deportation depends in part on the comparative effectiveness of ex ante and ex
post screening to accomplish different immigration policy objectives.92
To see this, consider the historical trajectory of America’s reliance on
deportation and exclusion. There has been a steady shift over time toward
increased reliance on deportation and, consequently, on the ex post screening
of immigrants. When the federal government first began to restrict immigration
in the 1870s and 1880s, it relied almost exclusively on ex ante screening. This
early immigration legislation was principally designed to exclude Chinese
immigrants. The first statute, the 1875 Page Act, targeted Chinese women,
requiring them to obtain certificates of immigration showing that they were not
entering the United States “for lewd and immoral purposes.”93 The Page Act
was followed by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited all
Chinese laborers from entering the country.94 Both statutes established purely
ex ante screening mechanisms. A potential entrant was either a Chinese laborer
or prostitute, or not.95 If she was, she was excluded; if not, she was admitted.
In contrast, federal ex post mechanisms were extremely rare early in U.S.
history. The sole exception was the short-lived Alien Act passed in 1789,
which permitted the President to deport aliens suspected of subversive
activity.96 The Page Act contained no deportation provisions.97 And although

92. As we noted above, the classic distinction between exclusion and deportation in
immigration law will often parallel the difference between ex ante and ex post screening. See
supra note 76. But it need not always do so. Ex ante and ex post screening differ in the
information that serves as the basis for the immigration decision. Ex ante screening relies on
pre-entry information while ex post screening relies on new facts that develop after entry.
While deportation by definition takes place after entry, it need not be based on new
information that develops after entry. Because it often is (as a statutory matter) based on new
information, however, the exclusion-deportation distinction is substantially correlated with
the distinction between ex ante and ex post screening.
93. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875 (Page Act), ch. 141, § 1, 18 Stat. 477. The statute also
prohibited felons and prostitutes from immigrating to the United States and criminalized the
importation of prostitutes and “cooly” labor. Id. §§ 3, 4. In practice, the Act was enforced
nearly exclusively against Chinese women. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and
the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 698-702 (2005).
94. Act of May 6, 1882 (Chinese Exclusion Act), ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
95. Whether a potential immigrant fit into one of these two categories was not, of`
course, always a simple factual matter. For a discussion about how immigration authorities
enforced the provisions of these early statutes, see, for example, SALYER, supra note 30, and
Abrams, supra note 93.
96. See Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (“[I]t shall be lawful for the
President of the United States at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such
aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have
reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations
against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States . . . .”). By
its terms, the Act expired two years after its passage. See id. § 6.
One other potential exception is that certain elements of one of the Chinese exclusion
laws of the 1890s may in practice have permitted a Chinese person to obtain readmission on
the basis of a certificate that showed that he or she had developed significant contacts with
the white community in the United States during her residence. Congress, in 1892, extended
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the Chinese Exclusion Act did permit the deportation of “any Chinese person
found unlawfully within the United States[,]”98 the deportation was still
formally based on pre-entry information—the fact that the noncitizen was of
Chinese national origin and did not already reside in the United States at the
time the Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted—and thus on ex ante grounds.99
This nearly exclusive ex ante focus remained until 1907, when Congress
for the first time clearly provided for the deportation of an immigrant solely on
the basis of post-entry conduct.100 The statute made deportable any noncitizen
woman who engaged in prostitution or was found living in a “house of
prostitution” within three years after entering the United States.101 Congress
expanded its ex post screening criteria over the following years, adding
criminal convictions and advocacy of anarchy to the types of post-entry
conduct that could get an immigrant deported.102 In one important respect,
however, the reliance on ex post information was restricted: nearly all of these
Chinese exclusion for ten years, broadened the coverage of exclusion to include most
Chinese persons, and created a presumption that any Chinese person found in the United
States was deportable “unless such person shall establish, by affirmative proof, . . . his
lawful right to remain in the United States.” See Act of May 5, 1892 (Geary Act), ch. 60,
§ 3, 27 Stat. 25. The regulations implementing this provision required all Chinese
immigrants to obtain a certificate of residence as proof of their lawful right to remain. But
the regulations provided that the certificate could be obtained only on the basis of the
testimony of two white witnesses. Had the regulations ever been widely enforced (they were
not), they would have amounted to a de facto test of each Chinese immigrant’s connections
to the white community in the United States. See generally SALYER, supra note 30 (detailing
the lack of enforcement of the certificate requirement).
97. It was not until 1907 that Congress passed legislation making immigrants
deportable for engaging in prostitution after entering the country. See infra notes 100-01 and
accompanying text.
98. Chinese Exclusion Act § 12, 22 Stat. at 61.
99. Id.
100. Prior to 1907, Congress had slowly begun to expand the statutory role of
deportation. In 1891, for example, Congress made noncitizens deportable for one year
following entry if they were found to have entered in violation of law. See Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086. But this deportation provision simply reflected
delayed ex ante screening, because deportation was based on pre-entry characteristics. The
1891 Act also made deportable “any alien who becomes a public charge within one year
after his arrival in the United States from causes existing prior to his landing . . . .” Id. While
this deportability ground turned in part on post-entry conduct—the immigrant’s becoming a
public charge—Congress’s focus on ex ante characteristics is clear in its limitation of this
provision to immigrants whose poverty arose from “causes existing prior to [entry].” Id.
101. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900.
102. See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (making deportable
“at any time within five years after entry . . . any alien who at any time after entry shall be
found advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of property, or advocating or teaching
anarchy, or the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States”); id.
(making deportable “any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one
year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude,
committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States, or who is
hereafter sentenced more than once to such a term of imprisonment because of conviction in
this country of any crime involving moral turpitude, committed at any time after entry”).
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provisions shared the feature of being time-limited. They made a noncitizen
deportable only if she engaged in proscribed conduct within a certain number
of years after entering the country. In the 1907 Act, for example, an immigrant
who engaged in prostitution four years after entering the country did not
become deportable.103
Over the last century, Congress steadily expanded the ex post screening
system by augmenting the list of post-entry conduct that would make a
noncitizen deportable. In 1922, Congress for the first time included certain
drug convictions.104 And the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act
in 1952 broadened the definition of subversives subject to deportation and
enlarged a number of other deportability grounds as well.105 This expansion
has accelerated in the last twenty years, as Congress has added additional
grounds of deportability—particularly criminal grounds—in a series of
immigration reform bills.106 The growth in ex post screening has been
augmented by two other important changes: first, Congress has extended the
screening period, eliminating the statutes of limitation for most grounds of
deportability;107 second, Congress has made the screening system more
categorical, eliminating many avenues of relief from deportation that in earlier
periods were available to noncitizens who engaged in deportable conduct.108

103. Immigration Act of 1907 § 3, 34 Stat. at 900.
104. See Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596 (making deportable any
noncitizen convicted of violating the statute’s prohibition on the importation of or dealing in
opium).
105. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952); see also E. P.
HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, at 30713 (1981).
106. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181;
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305; Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
107. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, § 3, 36 Stat. 263, 264-65 (eliminating the
statute of limitations from the 1907 Act’s ground of deportability for noncitizens who, after
entry, practiced prostitution or were associated with a house of prostitution); Act of Oct. 16,
1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (eliminating the 1917 Immigration Act’s statute of limitations
on the deportability of anarchists); cf. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917 § 19 (extending to
five years the statute of limitations for deporting public charges). Today such statutes of
limitation remain for only a few grounds of deportability. See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I),
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (making deportable noncitizens convicted of a single “crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission”).
108. Prior to 1996, statutory relief from deportation was available under a variety of
circumstances. All deportable noncitizens who could otherwise qualify for an immigrant
visa—even those without lawful status—were eligible for suspension of deportation if they
had lived for a sufficient period in the United States, were of good moral character, and
could make a showing of extreme hardship. See INA § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994),
repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-615. For lawful permanent
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Today, more so than at any time in the past, immigrants must prove themselves
by refraining from post-entry activities that run afoul of the statutory
restrictions.
What might explain the ever-expanding reliance on ex post screening over
time in American immigration law? One possibility is that first-order
preferences have changed: American immigration law may have begun to rely
more on ex post screening as it has become less racist. To the extent that past
immigration policy was interested principally in racial sorting, there was little
need for ex post selection mechanisms. Ex ante mechanisms were adequate
because the type of immigrant that the government was trying to select could
be identified on the basis of the immigration enforcement officer’s
determination of the immigrant’s race, which was observable from the
applicant’s physical features (such as skin color). As immigration law became
less openly racist over time, however, it would likely have become more
difficult to identify “desirable” immigrants on the basis of information
available at the time they entered the country. This slow shift in the first-order
preferences of immigration regulators would have made ex ante screening less
effective. And when ex ante screening mechanisms become less effective, ex
post screening becomes comparatively more attractive.
Alternatively we might find the explanation in a shift in screening
constraints rather than a shift of first-order preferences. Here there are a few
possibilities. First, suppose that early policymakers were not so much racist as
concerned about assimilation, and that they assumed that racial minorities
could be assimilated only with difficulty.109 The policymakers need not have
believed that all minorities are unassimilable, just that, on average, minorities
assimilate with more difficulty than immigrants of Anglo or perhaps German
stock. This was a standard argument made by policymakers in that era.110 But
as America became more racially and ethnically diverse, racial and ethnic
homogeneity no longer served as a reliable proxy for assimilability. Hence race
(or close proxies like national origin) was dropped as an ex ante criterion. In its
absence, ex post mechanisms became increasingly important. Though more
residents, somewhat more generous relief was also available under INA § 212(c). Congress
significantly restricted the availability of relief from removal in 1996 when it consolidated
the various relief provisions. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. After 1996, for example,
noncitizens convicted of “aggravated felonies” are categorically ineligible for relief from
removal. See INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). In addition to making the screening
system more categorical, we should note that the modern restrictions on relief from removal
have also altered the temporal dimension of the screening process. This is because relief
from removal has historically offset partially the elimination of statutes of limitation from
deportation provisions, as lengthy continuous residence in United States was often a central
factor in the provision of relief from removal. See INA § 240A(a)-(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(b).
109. For a discussion of the relationship between purposeful and statistical
discrimination, see David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99,
113-16.
110. See ZOLBERG, supra note 21.
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costly than observing physical features, the government might have believed
that evaluating an immigrant’s post-entry conduct—criminal activity, public
charge status, and the like—would provide better information about her
assimilability. Thus, one argument for the shift from ex ante to ex post—
consistent with our theory in Part II—is that as America became more diverse,
the correlation between type (assimilability) and the ex ante proxy
(racial/ethnic homogeneity) declined, so that the cost advantages of the ex ante
system became less significant.
Second, changes in the difficulty of policing the border may have been an
important variable. As Mae Ngai has noted, “Before the 1920s the Immigration
Service paid little attention to the nation’s land borders because the
overwhelming majority of immigrants entering the United States landed at Ellis
Island and other seaports.”111 Under these conditions it was comparatively easy
to screen potential immigrants at the point of entry. By the 1920s, however,
growing Mexican migration, the passage of the quota laws, and changing
political conditions brought new pressure to police immigration across the
Mexican and Canadian borders.112 And as migration across land borders
became a bigger and bigger part of the regulatory picture, the cost of exclusion
increased. It was simply much more difficult to police the nation’s long land
borders than it was to police the seaports.113 Because ex post screening
becomes more attractive as the cost of deportation declines relative to the cost
of exclusion, these structural changes in migration flows may also have made
ex post regulation more attractive over time.114
111. NGAI, supra note 15, at 64.
112. See id. at 52-53, 58-67.
113. While the cost of policing the border rose, it may also have been the case that
improved recordkeeping and communications technology—allowing authorities to keep
track of and share information about post-entry activities—reduced the cost of the ex post
system.
114. Of course, there are other possible explanations as well. While we describe more
fully below the ways in which constitutional law can shape the second-order structure of
immigration, it is worth noting that the steady expansion of ex post screening through the
proliferation of grounds of deportability might also have been connected to changes over
time in constitutional immigration law. The expansion of deportation may track the story
that Bill Stuntz has told about the expansion of substantive criminal law. As Stuntz has
explained, the Warren Court’s strengthening of constitutional criminal procedure made
criminal prosecutions more difficult and expensive for the government. This created an
incentive to try to circumvent these constitutional protections. One way to do that was to
expand dramatically the scope of substantive criminal law. See William J. Stuntz, Substance,
Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). Similar
logic can help explain the expansion in recent years of deportability grounds. Rather than
reflecting a change in first-order immigration preferences, the expansion might be a secondorder strategy to preserve government discretion that has been whittled away by the
expansion of due process protections available to noncitizens placed in deportation
proceedings. These protections have slowly expanded over the course of the last century
(though perhaps not quite as dramatically as criminal procedural connections expanded
under the Warren Court). See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 9; Peter H. Schuck, The
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2. The gap between exclusion and deportation grounds
Similar logic might help explain why modern immigration law sometimes
treats pre-entry and post-entry behavior so differently. As we noted in Part I,
many of the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability—such as the national
security grounds—are essentially identical.115 But not all are. Consider, for
example, the way that current immigration law treats criminal behavior
classified as an “aggravated felony.” Congress in 1988 made deportable any
noncitizen with a conviction for an “aggravated felony”—a term that the INA
initially defined to cover serious drug trafficking offenses.116 Since then the
definition has been repeatedly expanded by Congress.117 Today it sweeps in a
broad swath of criminal conduct, including minor convictions—even some
misdemeanors—that make the statutory label something of a misnomer.118
Commentators often criticize the aggravated felony provision on the ground
that it is too harsh.119 Less often noticed is the fact that a conviction for an
aggravated felony, which makes a lawful permanent resident deportable and
ineligible for nearly any relief from deportation (regardless of how many years
she has resided lawfully in the United States),120 does not constitute a ground
of inadmissibility.121 In other words, a conviction that will not lead to the
exclusion of a first-time arriving alien can lead to the deportation of a longterm permanent resident.122
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984). In practice, such due
process protections make it more difficult and costly for the government to deport a
noncitizen. But expanding the grounds of deportability and eliminating forms of relief from
deportation can help reduce these costs. Thus, the expansion of deportability grounds can
help augment the discretion of immigration enforcement agencies by relocating that
discretion to the charging stage of the enforcement process.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
116. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7344(a), 102 Stat.
4181, 4470-71.
117. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048;
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009627.
118. See INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE, supra note 27, § 71.05(2)(d) (examining case law interpreting the breadth of
“aggravated felony”); Dawn Marie Johnson, Note, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating
Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001).
119. See, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms
and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 633-35 (2003).
120. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (making noncitizens “convicted of any
aggravated felony” ineligible for cancellation of removal); INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(1) (making such noncitizens ineligible for asylum).
121. Compare INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), with INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2).
122. This does not mean that there are no criminal convictions that make noncitizens
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Why would Congress make the ex post screening system stricter than the
ex ante system in this fashion? First-order preferences are not the answer: no
one thinks that a person who commits an aggravated felony in the United States
is invariably worse than a person who commits an aggravated felony in a
foreign country. However, second-order considerations might answer our
question. A conviction in the United States might be better evidence of a
person’s type just because American authorities are familiar with and trust
American criminal law and procedures, while being largely unfamiliar with and
suspicious of the substance or procedures of foreign criminal law.123
Such a conviction also might be better evidence of the person’s type
because committing a crime in the United States might be better evidence of
qualities the government deems undesirable—like unassimilability—than the
commission of the identical crime in another country. For example, a person
might commit minor crimes in a foreign country because the probability of
detection and conviction is low and the punishment is trivial, or because this
type of illegality is widespread and considered socially acceptable. The same
crime, however, might have a different meaning in the United States, and,
among immigrants, it may be that mainly those who fail to assimilate commit
it. If so, commission of the crime might be a good ex post proxy of
unassimilability but not a good ex ante proxy of unassimilability.124
inadmissible. As we explained in Part I, the INA uses criminal convictions as grounds of
both inadmissibility and deportability. And a conviction that constitutes an aggravated
felony can also fall under one of the grounds of inadmissibility—if, for example, the
conviction also constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (defining “crime involving moral turpitude” as a ground of
inadmissibility). Even where there is overlap, however, convictions that constitute
aggravated felonies result in different treatment. As noted above, for example, a noncitizen
with an aggravated felony conviction is ineligible for almost all forms of relief from
removal. See IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 27, § 71.05(2)(c). A noncitizen
with a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is not subject to the same bars on
relief. See id. § 71.05(1)(e).
123. This cannot be the entire story. For while the INA’s deportability grounds cover
only aggravated felony convictions “after admission,” INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii), those convictions can technically be for an “offense in violation of the
law of a foreign country” (though in practice they almost never are), INA § 101(a)(43)(U),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U). Still, the sort of skepticism described above has been common
from the time of the earliest federal immigration law. The first federal statute to make a
person excludable on criminal grounds, the Page Act, made excludable immigrants “who are
undergoing a sentence for conviction in their own country of felonious crimes . . . .” Act of
March 3, 1875 (Page Act), ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974). But the statute
exempted crimes that were “political” or that were “growing out of or [were] the result of
such political offenses”—an acknowledgment that felony convictions in other countries
sometimes would not provide reliable information about whether or not an immigrant was
desirable. Id. This exception was carried forward in subsequent immigration statutes and
remains in the modern INA. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
More generally, skepticism about foreign law and legal judgments is an entrenched feature
of American law, though there are some exceptions. See Eric A. Posner & Cass Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
124. There are alternative theories as well. One possibility is that the harsher treatment
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In practice, the possibility that the aggravated felony category operates in
this fashion may be implausible, given some of the minor conduct that it
sweeps within its ambit. Our point here is not to defend this particular
deportability provision but to explain why institutional concerns might cause a
state to use different grounds for admission and deportation.
3. Constitutional constraints on second-order design
Our discussion to this point has emphasized how changes in screening
constraints or first-order preferences might account for the mix of ex ante and
ex post screening in American immigration law and its change over time. But
constitutional limitations may prevent the government from choosing its
preferred second-order design.
In Part I, we mentioned several such constraints, which collectively restrict
the government’s ability to regulate noncitizens who have lawfully entered the
country while providing the government much greater leeway to restrict entry
(and, to a certain extent, to deport those who enter unlawfully). The
government may often be able to use summary procedures in the latter cases
but not in the former, and equal protection norms apply to a much greater
extent to territorial regulation than to regulation of admission and
deportation.125 Another constitutional constraint with similar effect is the
guarantee of birthright citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment.126 By
conferring citizenship on all children born within the territory of the United
States, that amendment prevents the government from deporting children born
to immigrants after they enter the country—regardless of the status of the
immigrant parents. This deprives the government of some ex post screening
options. If the government adopts a large-scale guest worker program, for
example, it will not always be able to deport a guest worker’s entire family if it
decides to screen that worker out at the end of the probationary period. On the
margin, the guarantee of birthright citizenship, like the different requirements
for due process and equal protection, makes the ex ante system more flexible
and attractive for the government than the ex post system.
All of this implies, everything else being equal, that constitutional
constraints often make it more costly for the government to rely on the ex post
approach. As we noted above, the trend has in fact been in the direction of ex
of post-entry convictions reveals that the power to deport is being used as an additional
criminal sanction—rather than being used as an immigration screening device. While much
has recently been written on the intersection of immigration law and criminal law, this
possibility is too often overlooked. See generally Miller, supra note 119; Daniel Kanstroom,
Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make
Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890 (2000).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
126. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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post despite the constitutional barriers. But constitutional restrictions may well
cause the government to rely more on an ex ante system than it would like to,
or to structure ex post screening in a way that attempts to evade constitutional
restrictions. As we will explain below, the most important part of the modern
ex post system—the “illegal immigration system”—might fit this pattern: it
exists as a result of discretionary under-enforcement, which has the result of
avoiding some constitutional constraints that would otherwise apply.127 Of
course, such strategic substitution by the government can undermine the
benefits (in terms of constitutional values) of constitutional immigration law.
Discrimination prohibited at the ex post phase might persist in ex ante form. If,
for example, deportation procedures cannot be biased against Muslims, then the
government may bias admission procedures against Muslims or reduce the
national origin quotas from Muslim countries. It does not necessarily follow
that the current constitutional restrictions should be abolished—perhaps instead
they should be extended to the ex ante phase, though this could create
additional difficulties—but it does make it more difficult to assess the benefits
of existing constitutional restrictions.
B. The Ex Post System: Illegal Immigration and Guest Workers
1. Reconceptualizing illegal immigration
As we explained above, the legal immigration system is paralleled by a
shadow illegal system. Through this illegal system, as many immigrants flow
into the United States each year as through authorized immigration channels.
As a result, it is estimated that more than eleven million unauthorized
immigrants currently reside in the United States.128 Both the public debate and
existing scholarship typically view illegal immigration as an enforcement
problem that needs to be solved. The high level of illegal immigration is seen
as reflecting the government’s failure to enforce the existing immigration rules.
This premise has led to two lines of analysis. The first is positive:
commentators attempt to determine what factors (institutional, political, etc.)
lead to the enforcement failure.129 The other is normative: commentators

127. See infra Part III.B (discussing the illegal immigration system).
128. See PASSEL, supra note 4.
129. See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 15, at 129-53; Frank D. Bean & David A. Spener,
Controlling International Migration Through Enforcement: The Case of the United States,
in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET 352 (Douglas
S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor eds., 2004); Wayne A. Cornelius & Takeyuki Tsuda,
Controlling Immigration: The Limits of Government Intervention, in CONTROLLING
IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 7-15 (Wayne A. Cornelius et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004);
Monica Heppel & Demetrios Papademetriou, Government Intervention and the Farm Labor
Market: How Past Policies Shape Future Options, in FORUM FOR TRANSNATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT 38 (Amber Lopez, Cal. Inst. for Rural Studies ed., 2001); Philip Martin, Does
the U.S. Need a New Bracero Program?, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 127 (2003); Pia
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criticize the existing rules—often on the ground that the high levels of
undocumented migration make clear that the economy needs the influx of lowskilled workers—and argue that the government should liberalize its
admissions system to provide a legal pathway for these workers to enter.130
Our theoretical framework suggests a different way of understanding the
illegal immigration system. That system can be seen as a de facto ex post
screening system operated under the guise of an ex ante system.
This point has been obscured by the formal structure of law relating to
undocumented immigration. As a formal matter, noncitizens who enter the
country without authorization are deportable on that basis alone.131 And when
the government removes a noncitizen on the ground that she entered illegally,
the government appears to be simply enforcing the ex ante screening rule after
the fact of entry itself. The removal is based on information that existed at the
time the person entered—specifically, it is based on the fact that the person
entered without being admitted.132
Despite this initial impression, the present “illegal immigration system”
operates substantially as an ex post screening mechanism. This becomes clear
if one focuses on the enforcement decisions made by immigration officials
rather than on the formal legal grounds on which undocumented immigrants
are eventually deported. In theory, immigration authorities should pursue all
illegal entrants. In practice, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (one of the successors to the INS) has for some time focused its
enforcement efforts on those immigrants who are arrested for having
committed non-immigration crimes.133 In this way, the illegal immigration
M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented
Immigration? Evidence from IRCA, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 437 (2003).
130. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Poverty, Distributive
Justice, and Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759 (2003); Johnson, supra note 8;
cf. NGAI, supra note 15.
131. INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any
time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”).
132. This highlights the way in which the distinction between ex ante and ex post
screening does not always track the distinction between screening at the border and
screening after entry. Post-entry screening is still ex ante to the extent that it is based on
information that existed at the time of entry rather than on new facts that developed after
entry. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
133. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conducts investigations covering
five primary classes of activity: crime, illegal employment, fraud, immigrant smuggling, and
status violations. In recent years, criminal investigations have been the bread and butter of
ICE’s enforcement actions, making up 70% of ICE’s apprehensions in fiscal year 2003. See
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 147 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 YEARBOOK], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003Yearbook.pdf; see also
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE tbl.61 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/2001/ENF2001tables.pdf. Moreover, initiatives like the
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system operates substantially as a de facto ex post screening mechanism. On
the front end, under-enforcement at the border permits large numbers of
immigrants to enter the country without ex ante screening. Then these
immigrants are screened at some later date on the basis of their post-entry
conduct: those who avoid contact with the criminal justice system are generally
permitted to remain in the country, while those who have a run-in with the
police are often removed.134 Contact with the criminal justice system, then,
becomes the de facto proxy for type.135 The implicit theory is that, at least for

Institutional Removal Program (in which ICE works with state and local law enforcement to
remove incarcerated noncitizens), Operation Community Shield (in which ICE uses
immigration law to target gangs), and the Fugitive Absconder Program (in which ICE
focuses on the capture and removal of fugitive aliens, particularly those who have committed
crimes) further enhance the agency’s focus on criminal aliens. In light of these enforcement
priorities, “[f]ederal immigration officials[] . . . maintain that the vast majority of illegal
immigrants detained and deported are people convicted or charged with serious crimes.”
Paul Vitello, Path to Deportation Can Start with a Traffic Stop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006,
at A1; see also Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News television broadcast June 15, 2006)
(transcript available at 2006 WLNR 10374973) (interview with Julie Myers, Assistant
Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement). Over the last decade, ICE has
invested substantially fewer resources in other enforcement activities, such as workplace
raids, employer investigations, and enforcement against noncriminal visa overstayers. See
William Branigin, INS Shifts ‘Interior’ Strategy to Target Criminal Aliens; Critics Say Plan
to Curtail Work-Site Raids Will Hurt Immigration Compliance, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1999,
at A03; see also 2003 YEARBOOK, supra, at 157 tbl.39 (showing a plunge from 17,554
employment-related arrests in 1997 to 445 such arrests in 2003 and from 865 issuances of
Notices of Intent to Fine employers to a low of 53 such issuances in 2002); Eric Lipton,
Report Finds U.S. Failing on Overstays of Visas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at A13 (“[T]he
inspector general [of the Department of Homeland Security], Richard L. Skinner, predicted
that a ‘minuscule’ number of [visitors who overstay their visas] were ever likely to face
deportation, an action generally taken only if a person has a criminal history and is
detained.”). And while ICE has in recent months undertaken a few high-profile workplace
enforcement actions, see, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi & Nicole Gaouette, Employers’
Immigration Pains, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at A37, these activities do little to alter the
agency’s overall enforcement priorities. Instead, they appear more likely to be related to the
ongoing immigration reform debates in Congress.
134. In fact, because ICE focuses on criminal immigrants and faces significant
resource constraints, the agency often declines to pick up undocumented immigrants who are
detained by local law enforcement for having committed a minor infraction or appearing to
be in the country illegally. See Julia Preston, New Scrutiny of Illegal Immigrants in Minor
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2006, at A10 (“Immigration agents, overwhelmed by a
decade-old surge in illegal immigration to Colorado, said they had neither the time nor the
resources to pick up the illegal immigrants [arrested by local authorities] whose violations
were not grave.”); Vitello, supra note 133 (“There are simply not enough immigration
agents to respond every time a suspected illegal immigrant is arrested for driving with an
invalid license.”) (quoting a spokesman for ICE).
135. The government identifies deportable immigrants in the criminal justice system in
several ways. One way is through prison screening: ICE regularly interviews prisoners in a
number of prison systems in order to locate criminal aliens, and several state and local lawenforcement agencies have recently entered into agreements with the federal government
under which the law enforcement agencies are delegated authority to do the screening
themselves. See, e.g., Lance Pugmire, Immigration Check at Inland Jail Is OKd, L.A. TIMES,
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the pool of unskilled labor, authorities can better screen out undesired types by
waiting for noncitizens to commit crimes and expelling them than by using
some other proxy at the border ex ante.
Why might the government prefer an ex post system to an ex ante system
in this context? To the extent that the illegal immigration system operates in
significant part to supply low-skilled workers to domestic producers, as many
have argued, ex post screening might be more effective than ex ante screening.
It is difficult to select desirable low-skilled workers on the basis of pre-entry
information. There are few objective criteria like education or prior work
history that would be reliable indicators of the ability of a low-skilled
immigrant worker to be a productive employee in the United States. By
contrast, an applicant’s post-entry employment record is highly relevant, often
fine-grained information. This helps explain the Senate immigration reform
bill’s reliance on post-entry employment history as a central part of the
eligibility screening process for amnesty.136 And it suggests that a largely ex
ante screening system—like the point system Canada uses to select high-skilled
immigrants—would probably not work effectively for the immigrant pool
currently affected by the illegal immigration system.137
Thus, the immigration agencies have structured their enforcement priorities
in a way that transforms a central part of American immigration policy from a
de jure ex ante screening system into a de facto ex post screening system.
Moreover, if we draw back the lens and look at the illegal immigration system
across time, it becomes clear that the system is ex post in a quasi de jure sense
as well. The United States has periodically regularized the status of many of the
undocumented noncitizens living in the country through amnesties or other
mechanisms. Such status regularizations, which can legalize the noncitizens’
permanent residence and provide a pathway to citizenship, may become a
periodic feature of the contemporary American immigration landscape, as it
already is in other countries.138 In 1986, Congress passed legislation that
Sept. 21, 2005, at B3 (discussing agreements between federal immigration officials and Los
Angeles and San Bernardino counties allowing local law enforcement officials to screen for
illegal immigrants); see also 2003 YEARBOOK, supra note 133, at 150 (discussing the
Institutional Removal Program, whereby DHS cooperates with local law enforcement to
apprehend incarcerated immigrants).
136. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.
§ 601 (passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006).
137. Even if this is true, the heavy reliance on ex post screening might be
objectionable on other grounds. For example, ex post screening will often impose greater
costs than ex ante screening on immigrants and their families. Cf. supra text accompanying
note 85 (discussing the costs ex post screening can impose on residents with whom
immigrants develop relationships). One might argue that, as a moral matter, those personal
costs should weigh heavily in the policy calculation. Our explanation is meant only to
suggest that there are reasons why a self-interested government might prefer to rely
principally on ex post screening to select certain kinds of immigrants.
138. Nancy H. Chau, Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration Reform, 19 J. LAB.
ECON. 604, 605 (2001).
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legalized over two million undocumented immigrants.139 And right now
Congress is debating legislation that would legalize a substantial number of the
undocumented immigrants who arrived after the last round of regularization.140
These status regularizations make the existing illegal immigration system look
like not just a de facto, but a de jure ex post system. Rather than just permitting
undocumented residents to remain in the country so long as they do not engage
in post-entry behavior that leads to their being screened out, the government
eventually accords legal status and a path to full membership to those illegal
aliens who satisfy the ex post screening criteria embodied in the amnesty
program.
Consider, for example, the legalization program included in the
immigration reform bill passed by the Senate in 2006.141 The program does not
permit all undocumented noncitizens to legalize their status and become lawful
permanent residents. Instead, the program limits eligibility in a way that
suggests that it is being used by the government as an ex post screen.
Immigrants who have lived continuously in the United States for more than
five years meet the baseline qualifications for the program if they have worked
for at least three of those years and learned sufficient English to pass a
language and civics test. A path to legal permanent residency is open to those
who continue to work for six additional years after enactment of the bill, pay
back taxes, and register with the Selective Service.142 For immigrants who
have lived continuously in the United States for more than two but fewer than
five years, the requirements are more stringent: they must have been employed
before enactment of the bill and have worked continuously during their time in
the United States.143 (Here, steady employment appears to serve as a partial
substitute for longer residence in the country.) Individuals in both groups are
ineligible for legalization if they have been convicted of a felony or three or
more misdemeanors.144
The legalization program’s requirements are consistent with the idea that
those undocumented immigrants who qualify have demonstrated, through their
139. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359.
140. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 601
(passed by the Senate on May 25, 2006); Maura Reynolds, GOP Sends Mixed Messages on
Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at A17.
141. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006.
142. Id.
143. Id. There are other complications for this group of immigrants. Although they too
are provided a path to eligibility for legal permanent residency, the path is less
straightforward than it is for those who have been in the United States for more than five
years. Under the bill, immigrants in the country for more than two but less than five years
are initially granted only a three-year visa, after which they must briefly leave the United
States before returning. Id.
144. Id. This criminal history requirement is considerably stricter than the existing
crime-based grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2); INA § 237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3).
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conduct after entering the United States, that they should be admitted to
permanent residency and eventually citizenship status in the United States. This
explains why the government might choose to rely in large part on measures
like post-entry success in the labor market and a clean criminal record to screen
out some immigrants from the available pool.145 The government might
conclude that these ex post measures serve as superior substitutes for ex ante
screening criteria.
Understanding the ex post structure of the illegal immigration system
highlights the multi-“track” structure of American immigration law. The
United States desires both high- and low-skilled labor, but a single immigration
track might work poorly for both. So the United States offers two tracks. First
is the legal labor immigration track reserved principally for highly credentialed
immigrants. For this part of the market, the ex ante system does much of the
work. A second track—the illegal immigration system we describe above—is
available to less-credentialed, low-skilled workers. For this part of the market,
the ex post system does much of the work. This description is an
oversimplification: not all low-skilled workers are forced to immigrate
illegally, for example, and demand for high-skilled workers has often led to
their illegal immigration as well. Still, the rough two-track structure of the U.S.
system fits well with the information theory we set out in Part II.146
2. The guest worker alternative
Once we see that the illegal immigration system and Congress’s periodic
amnesties create a large-scale ex post screening process for immigrants and
need not simply reflect a failure to enforce existing immigration law, new
questions emerge. We might ask why the government does not just formalize
the system by replacing the illegal immigration system (including amnesties)
with a legal guest worker program. The government could relax entry
restrictions but then formalize the ex post screening elements that are today
embodied in agency decisions about enforcement priorities and congressional
decisions about periodic amnesties.
Congress is actually considering doing something like this right now. It has
been debating the possibility of creating a new guest worker program, and the
existing legislative proposals would formalize some elements of the present
145. The ex post screening criteria contained in the Senate bill are different from—and
in several ways more stringent than—those embodied in the INA’s deportability grounds,
which apply to all admitted noncitizens. See supra note 144. There are, of course, a number
of reasons why Congress might adopt more stringent ex post screening criteria as part of its
regularization legislation. The differences might be driven by the fact that immigrants
covered by the regularization legislation were never subjected to any ex ante screening; by
the fact that the regularization program is attempting to select for different sorts of
immigrants than are other parts of our immigration policy; or simply by the fact that
different political dynamics constrain Congress’s efforts to adopt a legalization program.
146. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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illegal system. The plan embodied in the Senate’s immigration reform bill
would dramatically increase the number of low-skilled workers admitted to the
United States.147 These immigrants would be authorized to enter the United
States for an initial period of three years, and each immigrant could seek one
three-year extension of this initial period.148 During the period of admission,
immigrants would be required to engage in approved work such as agricultural
labor; if they become unemployed, they would be required to leave the
country.149 Significantly, under the Senate’s proposal these immigrants would
also have the opportunity to apply for lawful permanent residency at the end of
their term.150
As with the illegal system, the main advantages for the government of a
guest worker program are twofold: by allowing the government to admit people
to fill temporary jobs without committing itself to keeping them, the program
offers the informational and flexibility advantages of ex post screening. Such
increased reliance on ex post screening is most appropriate for people whose
labor value does not depend heavily on country-specific investments. There
may, of course, be substantial countervailing costs associated with the
system.151 Our goal here is not to resolve the debates about the merits of
147. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 tit. VI.
148. See id. § 403.
149. See id. (stating that, subject to some exceptions, “the period of authorized
admission . . . shall terminate if the alien is unemployed for 60 or more consecutive days”).
150. See id. § 408. While these immigrants do not, as a result of their employment
history and residence in the United States, automatically qualify for LPR status, they appear
to face considerably lower screening requirements than potential employment-based
immigrants who have not previously lived and worked in the United States. See id. (easing
the adjustment of status requirements for a noncitizen who has been employed in H-2C
status for some time).
151. Critics of guest worker programs have raised a number of concerns about such
programs. These concerns, which focus on harms to the guest workers, to domestic workers,
or to the receiving country more generally include: (1) that guest worker programs increase
the exploitation of immigrant workers or perhaps even create a de facto caste system in
which American citizens have the full privileges of citizenship while nominally temporary
guest workers become second-class citizens; (2) that they harm those domestic workers who
are the least economically secure; (3) that they exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem
of unauthorized immigration; and (4) that they undermine existing mechanisms of
assimilation, even for immigrants who are not part of the system. See, e.g., BORJAS, supra
note 9; NGAI, supra note 15; Martin, supra note 129; Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Worker
Programs and the Threat to Immigrant Assimilation, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming).
These concerns are made more salient by the troubled history of guest worker programs in
the United States, Germany, and other countries. In the United States, the Bracero guest
worker program that ran from WWII until the late 1950s is thought by some to have led to
most of the above problems. See, e.g., NGAI, supra note 15. Germany’s high-profile guest
worker program has been similarly criticized. See Jacoby, supra note 34. To be sure, it
would be a mistake to conclude from these examples that guest worker programs were never
worthwhile. The details of any potential program would be crucially important. A central
problem with the German program was that children born to guest workers (and the children
born to those children) were not granted German citizenship. See id. While the presence of
the guest workers, children, and grandchildren raised serious concerns about assimilation,
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introducing a new guest worker program in the United States—though our
above discussion makes clear that the desirability of such a program must be
measured against the current system of tolerated illegal immigration. Instead,
we want to suggest one potential reason why Congress might prefer the
existing illegal immigration system to a large-scale guest worker program:
constitutional law.
As we discussed above, constitutional law will sometimes preclude an
immigration regulator from adopting her preferred mix of ex ante and ex post
screening mechanisms.152 Current constitutional doctrine might discourage
Congress from converting the existing illegal immigration system into a legal
one. This conversion would have the effect of increasing the constitutional
protections available to noncitizens in the system. Under the present regime
these noncitizens often enter without authorization and are, consequently, never
lawfully admitted to United States. Were the system formalized through
expanded entry provisions and greater formal reliance on ex post screening, the
same noncitizens would no longer lack legal status while they were in the
United States. Most importantly, their greater legal status would likely entitle
them to more constitutional protection than unauthorized immigrants. On the
present Administration’s view, for example, their legal status would mean the
difference between having some constitutional rights with respect to removal
instead of none.153
If immigrants who are presently part of the illegal system had greater
constitutional rights, the government would have less flexibility to pick
whatever ex post screening mechanisms it wished. For example, noncitizens
acquire greater procedural protections as their constitutional status rises.154
Accordingly, noncitizens who are in the country pursuant to lawful admission
have procedural due process protections that preclude the government from
deporting them on the basis of extremely summary procedures.155

deportation came to be regarded as both unfair and politically infeasible. A U.S. program
would obviously not have this structural issue because of the birthright citizenship clause in
our Constitution. And more generally, of course, the United States has traditionally had more
success assimilating noncitizens than have European countries.
152. See supra Parts I.C, III.A.3.
153. Cf. Respondents-Appellees’ Opposition to Request for Release from Detention
Pending Appeal at 9, Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-56759)
(arguing that “[a]liens arriving at our borders who seek admission have no constitutional
right to be admitted or paroled into the United States” and that, consequently, the petitioner
had no due process right to contest his detention, even where that detention was indefinite).
154. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982); supra text accompanying
notes 64-67.
155. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (holding that the Constitution
confers procedural due process rights on noncitizens in removal proceedings); cf. Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that due process required by the Constitution
precludes the unreasonably lengthy detention of a noncitizen subject to a final order of
removal).
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From the government’s perspective, therefore, there is a significant
advantage to the present illegal immigration system: it skirts constitutional
restrictions that might otherwise apply and, as a result, gives the government
greater flexibility in deciding how to deal with the noncitizen population that
currently immigrates to the United States through the illegal system. The
government can use this flexibility to lower the cost of the screening system or
to make it easier to achieve other policy goals—like expelling security risks as
new threats surface or competitors for scarce jobs during economic downturns.
As an example of this flexibility, consider INA section 235(b), the expedited
removal provision that we described in Part I.156 Under this provision, the
immigration agencies are authorized to use summary procedures to remove
noncitizens who entered the United States without being admitted, unless those
noncitizens have been in the country for more than two years.157 In practice
this means that the Attorney General can authorize a single immigration
enforcement official to order the removal of such a noncitizen, without a
hearing or any other sort of process.158 Were currently unauthorized
immigrants instead admitted through an expanded legal system, it would
almost certainly be unconstitutional to remove those immigrants by using the
summary enforcement mechanism authorized in section 235(b).159 The fact
that the current illegal system does not confer any legal immigration status on
those immigrants, however, helps preserve the possibility that the government
can rely on summary mechanisms that would otherwise be constitutionally
proscribed.160

156. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); see supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
157. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“The Attorney General
may apply [expedited removal] to any . . . alien[] . . . who has not been admitted or paroled
into the United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an
immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United States
continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility under this subparagraph.”). While the Attorney General is currently not
required to use expedited removal for all noncitizens within this statutory class, recently
proposed legislation would make expedited removal mandatory for all noncitizens in the
country for less than two years. See ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 18 (2006), available at
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33109_20060118.pdf.
158. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Narrow exceptions are
available for a noncitizen who indicates a fear of persecution in his home country or who
claims under oath to already have been lawfully admitted as a permanent resident or a
refugee. See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(C).
159. Cf. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21.
160. Again, of course, we do not mean to suggest that this is the only reason why
Congress might prefer the illegal system. An alternative theory is that the tolerance of illegal
immigration allows the government or public to maintain an “enticing myth” about
American norms—“to avoid seeing ourselves as the sort of people who exploit the
vulnerability of outsiders by holding a formal competition within our borders.” Saul
Levmore, Unconditional Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REV. 807, 818 (1996).
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C. The Ex Ante System: Family Migration and Alternatives
Family Migration. While the preceding Subparts have focused on ex post
elements, American immigration law also contains substantial ex ante
components. Like those of most liberal democracies, the formal ex ante
screening system in the United States favors highly skilled workers who have
skills that are in short supply in the native population. But to a much greater
extent than other liberal democracies like Canada, Australia, and the United
Kingdom, the United States also strongly favors immigration by persons who
have family relationships with American citizens.161 In this Subpart, we use
our framework to briefly evaluate this approach.
Why might the United States place such a heavy emphasis on family
relationships? One standard hypothesis is simply that the bias in favor of family
reflects a first-order policy judgment: Americans care more about family
intactness than people living in other countries do. The problem with this
hypothesis is that it seems implausible that Americans care about family
intactness more than other people do. To be sure, Congress has long
emphasized the importance of reunifying families. When Congress established
the family immigration system in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952,162 for example, the congressional reports accompanying the legislation
emphasized that Congress was consciously providing for “the preferential
treatment of close relatives of United States citizens and alien residents
consistent with the well-established policy of maintaining the family unit
wherever possible.”163 Similar statements about the importance of family

161. See Kara Murphy, Attracting the Best and the Brightest: The Promise and Pitfalls
of a Skill-Based Immigration Policy, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN FOCUS (Immigration Policy Inst.,
Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2006, available at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/infocus/infocus_
120506.pdf. See generally Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value
Family and Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273
(2003); Susan Martin & B. Lindsay Lowell, Competing for Skills: U.S. Immigration Policy
Since 1990, 11 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 387 (2005). Between 2003 and 2005, the United States
admitted between 489,082 and 649,201 family-based immigrants per year. This amounted to
between fifty-eight and seventy percent of the immigrant visas awarded in these years. See
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2005 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 18-19 tbl.6 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf (authors’ calculations based on the table).
In contrast, Canada during this period admitted between 63,352 and 65,125 family-based
immigrants, which constituted twenty-four to twenty-nine percent of the immigrant visas
awarded. See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT ON
IMMIGRATION 2006, at 17 tbl.3 (2006), available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/
pub/immigration2006_e.pdf; Citizenship & Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures 2004:
Immigration Overview: Permanent and Temporary Residents (July 31, 2005),
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pub/facts2004/overview/1.html.
162. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1691.
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reunification accompanied the passage of the 1965 amendments to the INA.164
These amendments strengthened the focus on family-based immigration at the
same time that other countries were taking a different approach. Canada in the
late 1960s established a point system for potential migrants designed to attract
high-quality workers. A potential migrant could earn only a tiny fraction of the
required points by having family already residing in Canada.165 Still, it would
be surprising if these divergent approaches were simply the product of different
first-order preferences—especially in light of the fact that many other cultures
have stronger family norms than Americans do.
Regardless of whether or not the first-order hypothesis is correct, our aim
is to focus attention on second-order possibilities: the bias in favor of family
might also be explained as an institutional design strategy in which family
relationship serves as a proxy for a first-order immigration policy goal.
Assimilability is one obvious potential goal; it may be that family members are
more easily assimilated than other types of immigrants. Another possible goal
might be the desire to achieve racial homogeneity. There is some evidence that
the family focus was designed in part to achieve one or both of these goals. In
support of the racial homogeneity hypothesis, the rules favoring family
intactness in part replaced the national origin quota system. The national origin
system was widely regarded as racist because it restricted immigration by
Asians and southern and eastern Europeans (as well as by Africans and others
who historically suffered from racial discrimination),166 and historical evidence
suggests that legislators who wanted to retain the national origin system settled
for the family relation rules because they were expected to preserve the racial
balance of the population (given that family members usually belong to the
same race).167
However, as we have noted above, the national origin system can also be
justified on the basis of concerns about assimilation rather than racism—
though, to be sure, the two policies overlap. Supporters of the national origin
system feared that noncitizens with different cultures and political views would
obtain disproportionate political power and change the character of the
republic. Whether or not this fear was justified, one can similarly understand
the family relations system as based on the view that family members can be

164. S. REP. NO. 89-748 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328, 3332.
165. See Shachar, supra note 89, at 171-74. It is notable, however, that the Canadian
scheme allowed for the contemporaneous migration of the approved worker’s family. See id.
166. Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996).
167. See ZOLBERG, supra note 21. Of course, the family migration rules did not end up
having this effect. Instead, there is evidence that they have contributed to the influx of
Hispanics into the United States by providing a legal pathway for Hispanic immigrants to
bring relatives to the United States—in some cases without being subject to the immigration
quotas. See INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (exempting immediate
relatives of U.S. citizens from the numerical restrictions on immigration).
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more easily assimilated than can others.168 To be sure, this second-order
hypothesis raises the question of why Americans would be more concerned
with assimilation than people in other countries would be. The answer is far
from clear, but it could be that the United States permits greater immigration
because of persistent historical labor shortages, and so the failure to assimilate
would be a larger social problem in the United States than in other countries.169
Alternative ex ante mechanisms. Economists have often proposed other,
more decentralized ex ante screening mechanisms for immigration. Julian
Simon and Gary Becker have proposed that visas for lawful permanent
residence be auctioned off.170 In terms of our framework, an auction would
serve as a screen. The good types would pay the most, and would be allowed
in; the bad types would not be able to pay as much, and so would be
excluded.171 Such a system would need to be accompanied by strong
enforcement to prevent illegal entry.
A central problem with these approaches is that they overlook first-order
goals that are of central importance to the government—such as assimilation.
The auction approach is desirable only if willingness-to-pay is correlated with
the types that the government deems desirable. This might be true at the very
highest end, but otherwise we are doubtful. One problem is that people often
have trouble borrowing against their human capital, so people with great skills
may not be able to afford a visa. Although employers could finance visas in
some cases, their incentives are not optimal, as they do not capture the full
value of the immigrant’s contribution when the immigrant’s skills are not
specific to one firm.172 More important, the noncitizens’ work skills are not the
only relevant factor; many other factors shape a state’s first-order immigration
preferences. States often care considerably about assimilability, including an
immigrant’s commitment to liberal, democratic institutions, for which
employers will have little concern. Yet from the state’s perspective, highly
assimilable people with low skills may be preferred to unassimilable people
with high skills. An auction would screen out the former while allowing in the
latter.173

168. For discussion of the role that family structures can play in the assimilation of
individuals, see generally THE NEW MIGRATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Marcelo
M. Suarez-Orozco et al. eds., 2005).
169. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 3.
170. See SIMON, supra note 8, at 357-63; Gary S. Becker, An Open Door for
Immigrants—the Auction, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1992, at A14.
171. A related idea is Michael Trebilcock’s mandatory insurance scheme, under which
anyone could enter the United States as long as she purchases insurance against becoming a
public charge. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 271 (2003).
172. Alternatively, the noncitizen could borrow on pain of deportation if she defaults
on the loan. For a discussion, see Levmore, supra note 160, at 811.
173. Trebilcock’s scheme suffers a similar defect. Like the auction, it ensures that the
noncitizens create welfare gains for the host society. But, also like the visa auction,
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Moreover, these alternative ex ante screening proposals overlook entirely
the advantages of ex post evaluation. This is of considerable importance
because the noncitizen applicant may not know whether she is assimilable prior
to entry; she may be as ignorant about her character in this respect as the
immigration authorities. If so, she will not know how much to pay for her visa.
CONCLUSION
Immigration scholarship has long overlooked important second-order
issues about the institutional design of immigration systems. Our aim has been
to highlight these second-order questions and to begin developing a theoretical
framework for addressing them. We draw an analogy between the immigration
system and the screening process by which employers choose employees, and
argue that the economics of information, which has productively been used to
analyze employment contracts, should be used to help understand immigration
design as well. A central design question for states is whether screening should
occur ex ante or ex post. Ex post systems are more accurate because they
exploit more information—both about potential immigrants and about the
government’s preferences and needs. But they discourage country-specific
investment, increase the risk that citizens will be harmed when deportation
severs social and familial ties or when noncitizens commit crimes on home
territory, and may be more costly to administer as well. We argue that many
immigration controversies—concerning the use of exclusion versus
deportation, criteria for admission, guest worker programs, and the severity of
sanctions for illegal immigration—are wrongly thought to be exclusively
controversies about first-order goals reflecting moral commitments. They are
often controversies about institutional design and, as such, are amenable to
institutional and empirical investigation.

mandatory insurance does not take seriously first-order concerns about assimilability—and,
unlike the visa auction, does not even take seriously a state’s interest in controlling the size
of its population.
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